What Gaddafi did for the CIA and MI6, no Libyan Revolution Central:
This is why the West suddenly fell in love with Gaddafi a few years back. He was the CIA’s preferred torturer.
Thursday, March 03, 2011
Kaddafy: de arqui-inimigo do Ocidente a torturador por sub-contrato?
Wednesday, March 02, 2011
O problema do Qaddafi/Kaddafi/Gaddafi: pouco militarista
Bloomberg.com: Qaddafi Military Spending Below Sweden's Leaves Authority Gap
Qaddafi spent an average 1.2 percent of gross domestic product on the military in the three years through 2008, the lowest in the Middle East and North Africa and also less than Sweden or Denmark, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute or Sipri, which tracks defense spending.
Ninguém por uma intervenção da ONU, impor um bloqueio do espaço aéreo, etc e tal?
"NATO Kills Nine Children in Afghan Air Strike: Already facing public outrage over the killing of 65 civilians in an offensive, NATO is once again in the hot seat in the Kunar Province, with provincial police reporting that a NATO air strike killed nine children this afternoon."
PS: eu não, espero simplesmente que a coligação do militarismo humanista de direita e o humanismo militar de esquerda caia em si mesmo.
Tuesday, March 01, 2011
Sobre a tese de doutoramento de Kadhafi filho
Esta é a tese de doutoramento do filho de Kadhafi (também referido no Margens de Erro):
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE DEMOCRATISATION OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS: From ‘Soft Power’ to Collective Decision-Making? [PDF, 429 páginas]:
AbstractA minha primeira observação - enquanto o pai parece um típico radical dos anos 60, com os seus projectos algo vagos de uma sociedade alternativa ao capitalismo ocidental e ao comunismo soviético (que, a dada altura, o tornaram popular tanto entre alguma extrema-esquerda como entre alguma extrema-direita), o filho parece o típico académico dos anos 90/00, com uma tese aparentemente cheia de referencias a autores e, já agora, a conceitos como "sociedade civil" e "instituições globais" (note-se que eu não li a tese - nem faço tenções disso - apenas o abstract e o indice).
This dissertation analyses the problem of how to create more just and democratic global governing institutions, exploring the approach of a more formal system of collective decision-making by the three main actors in global society: governments, civil society and the business sector. The thesis seeks to make a contribution by presenting for discussion an addition to the system of international governance that is morally justified and potentially practicable, referred to as ‘Collective Management’. The thesis focuses on the role of civil society, analysing arguments for and against a role for civil society that goes beyond ‘soft power’ to inclusion as voting members in inter-governmental decision-making structures in the United Nations (UN) system, the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and other institutions.
The thesis defends the argument that inclusion of elected representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in tripartite decision-making structures could potentially create a more democratic global governing system. This conclusion is supported by a specially-commissioned survey of leading figures in NGOs and IGO decision-making structures. The argument is developed in a case study of the WTO.
The thesis explains and adopts three philosophical foundations in support of the argument. The first is liberal individualism; the thesis argues that there are strong motivations for free individuals to seek fair terms of cooperation within the necessary constraints of being members of a global society. Drawing on the works of David Hume, John Rawls and Ned McClennen, it elaborates significant self-interested and moral motives that prompt individuals to seek cooperation on fair terms if they expect others to do so. Secondly, it supports a theory of global justice, rejecting the limits of Rawls’s view of international justice based on what he calls ‘peoples’ rather than persons. Thirdly, the thesis adopts and applies David Held’s eight cosmopolitan principles to support the concept and specific structures of ‘Collective Management’.
Mas, pelos vistos, a tese é um plágio (o que explica ainda mais a aparente falta de originalidade no estilo e no tema).
Os norte-americanos e os sindicatos da função pública
Há dias, O Insurgente referia uma sondagem que concluiu que 64% dos norte-americanos são da opinião que os funcionários públicos não devem ser representados por sindicatos.
Por outro lado, ontem o New York Times revelou outra sondagem dizendo que 60% dos norte-americanos são contra reduzir os direitos de negociação colectiva dos sindicatos de funcionários públicos (via Paul Krugman).
As posições não são totalmente contraditórias - alguém pode ser contra haver sindicatos, mas achar que, enquanto existirem sindicatos, esses devem ter direito a participar na negociação de salários e condições de trabalho; é uma posição difícil, mas é possível (provavelmente, um comunista de conselhos defenderá algo desse género); mas é estranho de qualquer maneira.
Uma possivel diferença é que a primeira sondagem foi feita apenas a eleitores recenseados [pdf] e a segunda parece ter sido feita simplesmente à categoria "adultos com telefone", independentemente de estarem ou não inscritos no recenseamento eleitoral (não faço ideia se essa diferença é significativa).
O que é mais provável?
Que daqui a uns anos seja possivel criar computadores mais inteligentes que o Homem (ideia que nalguns circulos está na moda)? Ou que seja possível criar (provavelmente recorrendo a reprodução selectiva) macacos antropóides mais inteligentes que o Homem?
Um outro tipo de bombista suicida?
In Libya, an unlikely hero of a youth-led revolution (Washington Post), via Libyan Revolution Central:
BENGHAZI, LIBYA - Mehdi Mohammed Zeyo was the most unlikely of revolutionary heroes. The bespectacled 49-year-old worked in the supplies department of the state-owned oil company. He was a diabetic with two teenage daughters.Onde é que eu quero chegar com isso? É que, a respeito dos atentados suicidas dos palestinianos, é frequente argumentar-se "bando de doidos/fanáticos; ainda por cima matam-se a eles próprios"; mas o atentado suicida (a começar no "nosso" Martim Moniz) há muito que é uma táctica de guerra respeitada - neste caso, ninguem se lembrou de chamar a Mohammed Zeyo "suicide bomber" (embora tecnicamente ele o seja); ou veja-se muitos filmes de acção norte-americanos, em que por vezes temos a cena do marine (normalmente ferido ou à beira da reforma) que fica para trás e explode uma granada quando é capturado pelo inimigo.
But something snapped inside him as a youth-led uprising in Libya against the government of Moammar Gaddafi quickly turned bloody.
For days Zeyo had carried the bodies of teenage boys from outside a security base in the center of the city where Gaddafi's militiamen fired on young protesters. Every day he went with hundreds of others to the cemeteries to bury the boys. His outrage grew, until Zeyo quietly made a decision, according to his family, friends and witnesses to his fiery death.
On the morning of Feb. 20, he walked down the stairs of his apartment building with a gas canister hoisted on his shoulder, witnesses said. He put two canisters inside his trunk of his car, along with a tin can full of gunpowder. Driving toward the base, he flashed the victory sign to the young men protesting outside and hit the gas pedal.
Gaddafi's security forces sprayed his black car with bullets, setting off a powerful explosion, witnesses said. The blast tore a hole in the base's front gate, allowing scores of young protesters and soldiers who had defected to stream inside. That night, the opposition won the battle for the base, and for Benghazi, as Gaddafi's forces retreated.
More than a week later, Benghazi remains the center of resistance to Gaddafi as Libya's leader of 41 years clings to power in the capital, Tripoli. Here, Zeyo's face has become the symbol of courage for this youth-led rebellion. A video of the explosion has spread across the city, passed from one cellphone to the next.
"What he did helped a lot of people live," Yousef Salah said as he stood outside Zeyo's apartment building, which has been labeled "the building of the martyr."
Salah said he was imprisoned inside the base that day. He had been protesting and throwing stones when security forces detained him. Every hour, Salah said, he was kicked, punched and threatened with death.
If Zeyo had not used himself and his car as a weapon, "I would have died. One more day and I would have died," the 21-year-old Salah said. He said that his father was killed at Abu Selim prison and that he had joined the demonstrations to protest his father's death.
Monday, February 28, 2011
O "governo provisório" líbio
Libya opposition launches council (Al-Jazeera):
Opposition protesters in eastern Libya have formed a national council, pledging to help free areas of the country still under Muammar Gaddafi's rule.
[O título do meu post está errado, já que eles dizem expressamente que o "Conselho" não é um governo provisório, mas era díficil pôr num título algo como "oposição líbia e cidades rebeldes estabelecem organismo de coordenação e representação"]
Hafiz Ghoga, spokesman for the new National Libyan Council that was launched in the city of Benghazi on Sunday, said the council was not an interim government.
"The main aim of the national council is to have a political face ... for the revolution," Ghoga told a news conference after the gathering to announce the council's formation.
"We will help liberate other Libyan cities, in particular Tripoli through our national army, our armed forces, of which part have announced their support for the people," Ghoga said.
On Saturday, former justice minister Mustafa Mohamed Abdel Jalil - who resigned from Gaddafi's cabinet on Monday in protest at the killing of protesters - told Al Jazeera he had led the formation of a body which would lead the country for three months to prepare for elections.
Both Libya's ambassador to the US and its deputy UN ambassador said they supported the initiative. (...)
Al Jazeera's Hoda Abdel-Hamid, reporting from Benghazi, said there was an understanding that the uprisings in different cities that have fallen into the hands of the opposition need to be concentrated under one umbrella to counter the regime.
"The ex-justice minister is taking the lead in this movement," she said.
"They have five representatives of each city or town and each time a new one falls, they immediately establish contact to have that city or town join this national council.
"There is a feeling here in the east that if they stay separated from the rest of the country, then it will soon look like a secessionist movement rather than an uprising."
Ghoga said the newly formed council was not contacting foreign governments and did not want them to intervene.
His comments came after US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Washington was "reaching out" to opposition groups in the east.and was prepared to offer "any kind of assistance" to Libyans seeking to overthrow the regime.
"We are reaching out to many different Libyans in the east as the revolution moves westward there as well," she said.
In places such as Benghazi that have ejected Gaddafi's loyalists, citizens have set up committees to act as a local authority and run services.
Intervenção internacional na Líbia?
On International Intervention and the Dire Situation in Libya, por Asli Bali and Ziad Abu-Rish, no site Jadaliyya (via twitter Libyans Revolt):
If al-Qaddafi’s regime falls today or tomorrow, debates about intervention will be moot. But unfolding events present an interesting opportunity to engage with interventionist arguments. The very fact that calls for intervention come at the eleventh hour and rarely emerge in time to make a meaningful impact or stave off the worst of atrocities in situations of crisis is itself worth noticing. Beyond that, we offer some reflections on the merits of different interventionist scenarios in the Libyan context specifically.
(...)
The first test of any would-be interventionist is this: do no harm. And there is very little evidence that direct intervention in the Libyan case could meet this test. For instance, calls for a no-fly zone by Libya’s Deputy Ambassador to the U.N. (drawing on the Iraqi precedent of the 1990s) and an air campaign by others (drawing on the Kosovo precedent from 1999) would surely fail this test. Neither option would shield the Libyan civilian population from the regime’s coercive apparatus (which is not principally aerial) and both options may entail serious costs to civilians by freezing or exacerbating the situation on the ground. Beyond raising questions of enforcement (would international forces fire on Libyan aircraft?), a no-fly zone might well block one method of escape for Libyan civilians or close an avenue for defections by members of the air force, such as the four pilots that are known to have flown out and defected in disobedience of direct orders to bomb civilians. Alternatively, air strikes run the risk of serious damage to both the civilian population and infrastructure. In short, any intervention must be crafted to offer real support to the civilian population of Libya, which direct forms of coercive intervention like no-fly zones or air strikes would not. But are there other forms of intervention that would be better suited to the task? Given limited knowledge of Libya’s internal dynamics at present and the heavy-handed interventionist toolkit developed to date by the international community any such option must be approached with caution.
Coercive options should be taken off the table. Absent the political will to commit ground forces to serve as a meaningful buffer between the regime and the population, any coercive intervention will do more damage (particularly to civilians) than good. Further, even if the political will existed for forceful intervention to offer direct protection to Libyan civilians, history suggests that the ultimate outcome of such intervention would still be harmful. Aside from the obvious potential threats to the civilian populations from the presence of foreign troops on their soil, including risks from a ground conflict and risks associated with the possibility of a prolonged presence, there are additional considerations that weigh against such intervention. At a time when the regime appears to be crumbling from within, as a result of the courageous mobilization of its own people, to engage in an eleventh hour intervention runs the very serious risk of depriving the Libyan people of their control over the hard-won transition they have initiated. To rebrand the Libyan uprising with the last minute trappings of international liberation (read: “Made in the West”) would do a serious disservice to the achievements of the protesters. Of course, none of this is to absolve the international community of its obligation to support Libyan civilians. Rather, we seek to identify a principled course of action that speaks to the dire situation, our responsibilities towards it, and the power relations that frame it.
In the immediate context, the most appropriate role for the international community is in providing humanitarian assistance and desisting from any further support to the regime. In addition to condemning the regime’s resort to violence, there are at least five modalities for the provision of such assistance, all of which should be employed immediately, with the support of the Security Council. First, all borders should be opened and appropriate facilities created to allow Libyan civilians to flee regime violence. If various governments are going to create exit routes through charter flights and land crossings for their own citizens, they also need to create a mechanism for Libyans to get out. Second, all available means for providing direct humanitarian assistance on the ground to the Libyan population should be utilized, including aid convoys to eastern Libya through Egypt and to western Libya through Tunisia. Third, al-Qaddafi’s assets and those of remaining elements of the regime should be frozen and kept in safe keeping to be given to whatever post-Qaddafi system emerges. Fourth, governments with ties to Libya should immediately sever all military ties, withholding delivery of materiel and cancelling all outstanding contracts. Finally, an arms embargo should be imposed preventing the sale or delivery of military equipment or personnel (including foreign mercenaries) to the Libyan state security forces. Sanctions that target military materiel, services and the movement of reinforcements from among foreign mercenaries are essential. Sanctions that go beyond these aims would run the risk of causing more harm to civilians than to the regime.
Beyond these measures, several other recent suggestions for intervention – ranging from direct coercion to demands for immediate international criminal accountability – raise a number of troubling implications that should give pause to those acting in solidarity with the Libyan people. (...) For instance, in a post-transition Libya, individuals with ties to the West or experience with energy markets might emerge as favored interlocutors, identified with international approval as “moderate” and “appropriate.” To invite forceful international intervention in the last days of the current regime might empower external interveners to make such choices, potentially at the expense of the preferences of the Libyan people. Particularly in light of how little is known about the current political dynamics among opposition groups within Libya, international intervention may entail a particularly high risk that the narrative framing of events will be captured by external actors in ways that are adverse to local Libyan choices.
Even more troubling, however, are the implications for regime risk calculations associated with the differential international position of the Libyan state as compared to Tunisia and Egypt. As we have seen, despite clear evidence that the regime has lost its grip on power as a result of the scale of the popular mobilization and defections, al-Qaddafi appears to be upping the ante rhetorically and in practice with escalations of violence. The likelihood that he will continue to raise the stakes is a real one that turns on two factors. The first is al-Qaddafi’s continued control of at least a proportion of his security forces, including parts of the military. The second is the absence of alternatives to a desperate bid to retain power through force. There is little that international actors can do to influence the first factor other than make clear that anyone who commits acts of violence against civilians, whether or not under orders, will be investigated and held liable under standards of international accountability. International measures designed to influence those within the chain of command of the military or security forces to switch sides and support the demonstrators are certainly legitimate. In practice, however, internal dynamics are far likelier to impact these immediate calculations than threats of future prosecution. There is, however, a chance to influence the second factor more decisively.
(...) Outside of Sudan, few leaders in the region are likely to have as keen an appreciation of the prospects of imprisonment, prosecution, and sentencing by an international court as al-Qaddafi. In fact, this scenario is quite plausible should al-Qaddafi physically survive the end of his regime, since he would offer the international community an excellent opportunity to symbolically stand with protesters across the region at low cost. Whereas meaningful accountability for deposed former Western allies might prove embarrassing, the prosecution of al-Qaddafi would vindicate calls for international justice without similar risks. Unlike the final indignity of a forced but comfortable resignation in Egypt and Tunisia, al-Qaddafi might well appreciate that his final days will more closely resemble those of the deposed Iraqi dictator made to stand trial. The prospect of retirement in a prison cell in the Hague may factor into al-Qaddafi’s incentives to make good on his threats to fight to the last of his capacities, visiting untold atrocities on Libyan civilians in the process. Paradoxically, then, providing al-Qaddafi with an immediate exit strategy to a safe haven might be the right choice from a humanitarian perspective. Shifting the regime’s incentives by offering an option that is neither death nor prosecution may well be the most humanitarian of presently available options for international intervention. Working with Venezuela, neighboring countries or others that would be willing to provide safe passage to Qaddafi would be far preferable than the apocalyptic endgame that the regime might otherwise pursue for lack of alternatives. The missed opportunity to pursue immediate prosecution pales in comparison to the death and destruction that might be avoided by shifting the regime’s risk calculation in this way. Moreover, little is lost by pursuing an immediate exit strategy today while leaving open the possibility of international criminal accountability down the line. In truth, international prosecutions take significant time and resources and do not represent an immediate alternative regardless. Threatening al-Qaddafi with war crimes prosecutions today may create perverse incentives with little strategic benefit. Securing him an exit option now may have the strategic benefit of sparing the Libyan people the violent death throes of their doomed regime.
We thus return to our original do-no-harm principle. We neither advocate abandoning the Libyan people to the violence of the regime nor protecting al-Qaddafi from accountability. But as calls for international intervention grow, we must worry about the risk of counter-productive results for Libyans on the ground of some of the options being considered. A combined strategy of humanitarian assistance, severing existing military ties with the regime, and generating exit options for al-Qaddafi and his family may well be the best course for accomplishing the goal of supporting Libya’s civilian population.
Pacheco Pereira sobre as revoluções árabes
Este artigo de Pacheco Pereira já foi analisado e criticado noutros sítios. Mas há uma parte que me chamou especificamente a atenção:
É por isso que uma das coisas que não encaixavam na narrativa sobre a revolta árabe era ver a multidão na Praça Tahrir a rezar. Não que a fé e a oração públicas sejam por si só incompatíveis com a laicidade de um Estado, mas porque não havia excepções na muralha de corpos prostrados. Não havia cristãos na multidão, não havia um ateu, um agnóstico, alguém que não fosse religioso, e permanecesse de pé ou à margem da oração?Pacheco Pereira terá visto as mesmas reportagens que eu? É que uma cena típica que era apresentada era, exactamente, os manifestantes muçulmanos a rezar e os manifestantes cristãos a fazer um cordão humano à sua volta.
Saturday, February 26, 2011
Mandar os marines?
É praticamente impossível saber o que o "líbio médio" pensa neste momento; mas entre os oposicionistas líbios activos no Twitter não parece haver grande entusiasmo pela ideia de mandar os marines ou outras forças dos EUA/ONU/NATO para o país (embora alguns defendam uma zona de exclusão aérea).
Thursday, February 24, 2011
Tuesday, February 22, 2011
A descolonização do "mandato britânico da Palestina" - o grande erro?
Um comentador israelita sobre as revoluções árabes - "When we try to think how and why the United States and the West lost Egypt, Tunis, Yemen and perhaps other countries in the Middle East, people forget that. The original sin began right after WWII, when a wonderful form of government that protected security and peace in the Middle East (and in other parts of the Third Word) departed from this world following pressure from the United States and Soviet Union... More than sixty years have passed since the Arab states and the countries of Africa were liberated from the 'colonial yoke,' but there still isn't an Arab university, an African scientist or a Middle Eastern consumer product that has made a mark on our world." (via al-Jazeera)
Realmente, após a II Guerra Mundial, a pressão conjugada dos EUA e da URSS (incluindo os seus satélites) na ONU levou o Reino Unido a abandonar o território que administrava na chamada Palestina, o que de facto afectou bastante a segurança e a paz no Médio Oriente.
Diga-se que o pais resultante desse processo até pode ter tido uns casos pontuais de cientistas, universidades ou produtos com algum sucesso, mas nada que se compare com os patamares que, no Ocidente, têm sido regularmente atingidos por individuos com as mesmas raízes étnico-religiosas.
A Soviet Foreign Policy: A Revisionist Perspective by Murray N. Rothbard
Um texto marco de Murray N. Rothbard (1973, data do seu manifesto For a New Liberty, the Libertarian Manifesto) que como muitos outros no domínio da política externa o pôs no campo dos malditos (deixou de escrever na National Review, acusado de isto e aquilo).
Dr Henry Kissinger is the best
Apareceu no twitter um tal de Dr Henry Kissinger [@Henry_Kissinger view full profile → New York, 56th United States Secretary of State and Chairman, Kissinger Associates] que é fabuloso, ver aqui: http://twitter.com/#!/Henry_Kissinger
Henry_Kissinger Dr Henry Kissinger
I understand Gaddafi will refute malicious rumors he has fled Libya on a special broadcast on Venezuelan State Television.
Henry_Kissinger Dr Henry Kissinger
Those attacking my friend,Silvio Berlusconi,as a sleazy, corrupt, sexist, meglomaniac drunk are out of line. He does not drink @monaeltahawy
Henry_Kissinger Dr Henry Kissinger
Latest: State Dept.'s new Libya statement: "Gaddafi should cease massacring his people as soon as is practicable."
Henry_Kissinger Dr Henry Kissinger
So when I warned of Domino Effect for communism, I was "crazy". When you warn of it for "democracy" you're mother-fucking-teresa?
Monday, February 21, 2011
Vantagens da distracção?
Bother Me, I'm Thinking, no Wall Street Journal (via Marginal Revolution):
In fact, the ability to pay attention is considered such an essential life skill that the lack of it has become a widespread medical problem. Nearly 10% of American children are now diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).[Um comentário lateral - não sei se o facto da condição designada "Perturbação do Déficit de Atenção/Hiperactividade" ser, na linguagem comum, simplesmente chamada "hiperactividade" - apesar de grande parte das pessoas com PDAH não serem hiperactivas, algumas muito pelo contrário - não levará a grandes equivocos sobre a sua natureza]
In recent years, however, scientists have begun to outline the surprising benefits of not paying attention. Sometimes, too much focus can backfire; all that caffeine gets in the way. For instance, researchers have found a surprising link between daydreaming and creativity—people who daydream more are also better at generating new ideas. Other studies have found that employees are more productive when they're allowed to engage in "Internet leisure browsing" and that people unable to concentrate due to severe brain damage actually score above average on various problem-solving tasks.
A new study led by researchers at the University of Memphis and the University of Michigan extends this theme. The scientists measured the success of 60 undergraduates in various fields, from the visual arts to science. They asked the students if they'd ever won a prize at a juried art show or been honored at a science fair. In every domain, students who had been diagnosed with attention-deficit disorder achieved more: Their inability to focus turned out to be a creative advantage.
A War Built on Four Lies
Em: Why Germany Must End its Deployment in Afghanistan, A Commentary by Jürgen Todenhöfer
[Jürgen Todenhöfer, 70, served as a representative in the Bundestag, Germany's federal parliament, as a member of the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) from 1972 to 1990. He has also served as a judge and a member of the executive board of the German media company Hubert Burda Media. Todenhöfer has made regular visits to Afghanistan since 1980 and wrote about them in his 2010 book "Teile Dein Glück" ("Share Your Good Fortune").]
"(...)
The Four Lies about the War in Afghanistan
Since no one really wants to repeat such platitudes, they prefer to tell fairy tales like the ones they used with Iraq. Their hands hold swords, while their mouths tell lies. When it comes to the war in Afghanistan, there are four lies:
The first lie says we're there to fight international terrorism. Even David Petraeus, supreme commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, conceded in May 2009 that al-Qaida is no longer operating in Afghanistan. The organization became decentralized a long time ago, with nerve centers spread around the globe. And al-Qaida's leaders don't transmit instructions from Afghanistan anymore because all electronic data traffic in the region is monitored by American drones and satellites.
In Afghanistan, what we're really fighting is not international terrorists, but a national resistance movement -- and, in doing so, we're creating exactly the thing we claim to be combating. For every civilian we kill, 10 more young people across the globe rise up, determined to strike back with terror. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the former commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, called this "insurgent math" in the interview that would ultimately cost him his job. Like a boomerang, our own violence comes back to haunt us in the guise of global terrorism.
The second lie is that we're there to defend our civilization's values. I recently held a position teaching constitutional law. I tried to explain to my students that our constitution protects every individual's dignity. No one can be deprived of his or her freedom without a trial. But where is human dignity being respected in Afghanistan? Every day, two to three Afghan civilians die at the hands of Western troops. By night, nameless American death squads move in to liquidate resistance leaders -- and often civilians as well -- violating the most basic rules of international law. Young Afghans have sat in the Bagram torture prison for years with no hope of being granted a trial and in conditions worse than at Guantanamo.
Our "defenders of civilization" never considered this worthy of a parliamentary debate. Indeed, since the dawn of colonialism, our involvement in the Muslim world has never been about defending our civilization's values; it's about defending our interests -- and Iraq and Afghanistan are merely the latest episodes in a long history. What's more, in most cases we've even been more brutal than our Muslim opponents. Granted, over the past 19 years, al-Qaida has brutally murdered some 3,500 Western civilians in the United States and Western Europe. But former US President George W. Bush has hundreds of thousands of civilian lives on his conscience in Iraq alone -- and all of this is in the name of our civilization.
The third lie is that we prioritize civilian reconstruction over military activities. Although the US spent $100 billion (€74 billion) on the war in 2010, only $5 billion of that was for development aid -- and 40 percent of this "aid" happened to flow back to the US as profit and fees. The rest of the money had to wind its way through the dark channels of international subcontractors before a trickle of 20-30 percent finally reached development projects.
Germany likewise puts into reconstruction only a fraction of what it spends on its military. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Afghanistan is currently the poorest country in Asia, and UNICEF estimates that 20 percent of all children there die before reaching the age of five. Even US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry admits that 77 percent of Afghans don't have access to clean drinking water and 45 percent go hungry. Under these circumstances, can we really call this "prioritizing civilian reconstruction"?
The fourth lie is that we're in the Hindu Kush to prevent the return of the Taliban for good. That almost sounds like a goal we can rally behind. After all, who really wants to see a return of those Stone Age warriors who trample women's rights under their feet? Nevertheless, the truth is actually much more complex. The Taliban already controls half of Afghanistan, and the danger that it will capture the rest won't be any smaller four years from now. Indeed, the Afghan Taliban grows stronger every day and -- unlike its imitators in Pakistan -- it seems to have learned from past mistakes. The New York Times has reported that, in some regions controlled by the resistance, girls are once again being barred from attending school -- with the Taliban's approval. The "Layeha," or "book of rules," laid down by Taliban spiritual leader Mullah Omar suggests that things will soon change in many respects.
Even if things were different, the Taliban's unacceptable worldview is still not a good enough reason to wage war. If that were the case we would also have to invade Somalia, Yemen and North Korea and a number of other authoritarian states, some of which we even count among our allies. The world would become one massive, bloody battlefield.
(...)"
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