Uma longa austeridade para a Irlanda

Ireland Enduring a Long Age of Austerity (Wall Street Journal):

Ireland enters its second year in the ungentle embrace of its bailout providers facing a further €3.8 billion ($5 billion) of budget cuts. It is by general acclamation the star pupil among the growing group of euro-zone members that have lost the confidence of bond investors, and the closest thing the currency area has to a success story.

And yet it still faces massive challenges. Few Irish economists would argue that it is certain or even very likely to continue to meet its targets for cutting its budget deficit and repairing its banks. One reason for this is that it is becoming more difficult for Ireland to find buyers for its exports in the slowing economies of the euro zone and the U.K.

Divida e juros da dívida

 The Most Basic Assumption About Sovereign Debt Turns Out To Be 100% Wrong (Business Insider):

One of the most cherished ideas in the analysis of sovereign debt is that debt-to-GDP is a useful measure of a country's credit stress.

For example, Germany hopes the Eurozone can avoid another sovereign debt crisis like the one its currently in if country's are forced to keep sovereign debt at around 60% of GDP.

Conversely, economists like Reinhart and Rogoff have argued that countries start to get into trouble when debt tops 90% debt-to-GDP.

Other economists have argued that when debt hits 80% of GDP, a country's growth tends to get suppressed.
So you get the point, a lot of people think debt-to-GDP is a big deal.

So you'd think, then, that with investors more attuned to sovereign debt issues than ever, that countries with a higher debt to GDP ratio would pay more to borrow.

Well, that turns out to be wrong.

Using data from Bloomberg, we looked at basically all of the big emerging and developed markets* with a big bond market, and good data on debt to GDP and decided to check to see if there was any connection at all between debt to GDP and the yield on their 10-year bonds.

The answer, quite clearly, is no.

In fact, using an exponential regression, we detect a slight shift down and to the right, meaning that the more debt a country has relative to its GDP, the cheaper it is to borrow.

This chart even includes the ultra-outlier Greece, which A) is highly unusual and B) is super-tiny, and yet is given the same weighting as Japan in our system.

As raízes anarquistas do OWS

Occupy Wall Street's anarchist roots, por David Graeber, no site da Al-Jazeera:

How, then, did OWS embody anarchist principles? It might be helpful to go over this point by point:

1) The refusal to recognise the legitimacy of existing political institutions. (...)


2) The refusal to accept the legitimacy of the existing legal order. (...)

3) The refusal to create an internal hierarchy, but instead to create a form of consensus-based direct democracy. (...)

4) The embrace of prefigurative politics. (...)

John Rawls, mais radical do que se diz?

Occupy Wall Street and the deradicalized Rawl, por Will Wilkinson:

Later on in the course of his argument, Rawls evaluates the relative merits of different economic systems and acknowledges that markets institutions have a number of advantages over the alternatives: they deliver the goods people want; they efficiently allocate labor; they decentralize economic power. Nevertheless Rawls concludes that “justice as fairness," which is what he calls his favored theory of justice, "includes no natural right of private property in the means of production.” And he is skeptical that his theory can accommodate even a conventional right to private property in the means of production. When it comes to determining what manner of political economy best realizes the ideal of justice as fairness, Rawls “leaves open the question whether its principles are best realized by some form of property-owning democracy or by a liberal socialist regime,” neither of which remotely resembles the actual American system.

If we focus primarily on Rawls' difference principle, as opposed to what he does and does not include in his list of basic rights, it's easy to come to the conclusion that Rawlsian justice demands relatively laissez-faire capitalism together with a very generous welfare state. Free markets make a country rich and robust social insurance ensures that even the worst-off enjoy the benefits of all that wealth. As it turns out, the worst-off are best off in countries, such as Denmark, that have settled on precisely this formula, which Rawls called "welfare-state capitalism." But Rawls rejected welfare-state capitalism, because he rejected capitalism generally. Before we even get to distributional questions, we've got to ensure that the full worth of Rawls' privileged political and civil liberties are equally guaranteed to all, and he thought no form of capitalism, which by its nature allows for large inequalities in ownership of the means of production, could do that. (Here's a good post by Daniel Little on what Rawls meant by "property-owning democracy," the type of regime he favored.)

A property-owning democracy, por Daniel Little:

In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001) Rawls offered a more explicit discussion of this concept than was offered in A Theory of Justice: Original Edition (1971).  Here are several important descriptions:

Let us distinguish five kinds of regime viewed as social systems, complete with their political, economic, and social institutions: (a) laissez-faire capitalism; (b) welfare-state capitalism; (c) state socialism with a command economy; (d) property-owning democracy; and finally, (e) liberal (democratic) socialism. (...)

Rawls argues that the first three alternatives mentioned here (a-c) fail the test of justice, in that each violates conditions of the two principles of justice in one way or the other.  So only a property-owning democracy and liberal socialism are consistent with the two principles of justice (138).  Another way of putting this conclusion is that either regime can be just if it functions as designed, and the choice between them is dictated by pragmatic considerations rather than considerations of fundamental justice.

Here is how Rawls describes the fundamental goal of a property-owning democracy:

In property-owning democracy, ... the aim is to realize in the basic institutions the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal.  To do this, those institutions must, from the outset, put in the hands of citizens generally, and not only of a few, sufficient productive means for them to be fully cooperating members of society on a footing of equality (140).

Rawls isn't very explicit about the institutions that constitute a property-owning democracy, but here is a general description:

Both a property-owning democracy and a liberal socialist regime set up a constitutional framework for democratic politics, guarantee the basic liberties with the fair value of the political liberties and fair equality of opportunity, and regulate economic and social inequalities by a principle of mutuality, if not by the difference principle.  (138)

This last point is important:

For example, background institutions must work to keep property and wealth evenly enough shared over time to preserve the fair value of the political liberties and fair equality of opportunities over generations. They do this by laws regulating bequest and inheritance of property, and other devices such as taxes, to prevent excessive concentrations of private power. (51)

And concentration of wealth is one of the deficiencies of a near-cousin of the property-owning democracy, welfare-state capitalism:

One major difference is this: the background institutions of property-owning democracy work to disperse the ownership of wealth and capital, and thus to prevent a small part of society from controlling the economy, and indirectly, political life as well.  By contrast, welfare-state capitalism permits a small class to have a near monopoly of the means of production. (139) [also Collected Papers, p. 419]

Estilos de escrita

Three Writing Styles, por Robin Hanson e The secret life of pronouns, por James W. Pennebaker (New Scientist):

[T]hree very different writing styles: formal, analytic and narrative.

Formal writing often appears stiff, sometimes humourless, with a touch of arrogance. It includes high rates of articles and prepositions but very few I-words, and infrequent discrepancy words, such as “would”, and adverbs. Formality is related to a number of important personality traits. Those who score highest in formal thinking tend to be more concerned with status and power and are less self-reflective. They drink and smoke less and are more mentally healthy, but also tend to be less honest. As people age, their writing styles tend to become more formal.

Analytical writing, meanwhile, is all about making distinctions. These people attain higher grades, tend to be more honest, and are more open to new experiences. They also read more and have more complex views of themselves.

Narrative writers are natural storytellers. The function words that generally reveal storytelling involve people, past-tense verbs and inclusive words such as “with” and “together”. People who score high for narrative writing tend to have better social skills, more friends and rate themselves as more outgoing.

Ruptura da Zona Euro - os detalhes legais

The legal aspects and abstractions of a euro redenomination, por Joseph Cotterill (Financial Times):

[Um ponto - há uns dias o meu banco mandou-me uns prospectos sobre umas aplicações "submetidas à lei inglesa"; achei estranho, mas após ler o link acima acho que percebi o porquê da coisa]

Exército dos EUA com poderes para deter qualquer pessoa em qualquer sitio?

É o que se discute no Senado dos EUA (via ACLU e Business Insider):

The Senate is going to vote on whether Congress will give this president—and every future president — the power to order the military to pick up and imprison without charge or trial civilians anywhere in the world. Even Rep. Ron Paul (R-Texas) raised his concerns about the NDAA detention provisions during last night’s Republican debate. The power is so broad that even U.S. citizens could be swept up by the military and the military could be used far from any battlefield, even within the United States itself.

 The worldwide indefinite detention without charge or trial provision is in S. 1867, the National Defense Authorization Act bill, which will be on the Senate floor on Monday. The bill was drafted in secret by Sens. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.) and passed in a closed-door committee meeting, without even a single hearing. (...)

In support of this harmful bill, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) explained that the bill will “basically say in law for the first time that the homeland is part of the battlefield” and people can be imprisoned without charge or trial “American citizen or not.” Another supporter, Sen. Kelly Ayotte (R-N.H.) also declared that the bill is needed because “America is part of the battlefield.”

O Caso DSK, - perguntas por responder

What Really Happened to Strauss-Kahn?, em The New York Reviw of Books:

 [Ver também o meu post de Julho, O Caso Strauss-Kahn]

As "entrevistas rápidas" para empregos

Haverá alguma prova cientifica que relacione a firmeza do aperto de mão com a produtividade no trabalho (como parece ser a filosofia das chamadas "entrevistas rápidas")?

Até é possível que haja, mas muitas vezes parece-me que grande parte desses "critérios de selecção" têm mais a ver com um preconceito social favorável à extroversão do que com outra coisa qualquer.

Economia e politica externa

Why Most Economists Are Hawks and Why They Might Be Wrong, por Brian Caplan:

I've never seen a survey, but casual empiricism makes me think that economists are hawks. Arnold Kling calls himself a Jacksonian - "the patriotic fighters for whom the worst sin is not going to war, it's losing one." But even liberal Democratic economists strike me as pretty eager to settle international disputes by bombing enemies back into the Stone Age.

The use of force is easy to rationalize in terms of basic economics. "We should make them PAY for what they've done!" It's just the law of demand: raise the price of crossing us, and fewer people will cross us. Make the price another Hiroshima, and perhaps the quantity demanded will fall to zero.

There is something to this line of argument, but it is too simple by far. Consider the following example. Suppose you go up to everyone you work with and tell them: "If you even think about getting in my way, you will be in a world of pain!" (...) You're raising the price of getting in your way, right? So the predicted effect of this threat should be to make people treat you better.

That's a crazy prediction. Making dire threats might scare some enemies off, but its primary effect would be to create new enemies. People who didn't care for you before will now be out to getcha.

So why doesn't the law of demand work in this situation? Threats and bullying don't just move along the "demand for crossing you" curve. If your targets perceive your behavior as inappropriate, mean, or downright evil, it shifts their "demand for crossing you" out. Call it psychology, or just common sense: People who previously bore you no ill will now start looking for a chance to give you a taste of your own medicine.

Ainda sobre empresários e "empreendedores" - o paradoxo do Tio Patinhas

A personagem da BD "Tio Patinhas" é um bom case studie para a questão de se os assalariados também podem ser considerados "empreendedores".

Qual é o "paradoxo do Tio Patinhas"? É que, no seu universo, o personagem é a caracterização da ideia heróica do empresário-empreendedor - é ele que vem com as ideias para produtos e negócios; qualquer problema numa das suas empresas algures no mundo, mete-se no avião para o ir solucionar, etc. (é verdade que em contraste com essa micro-gestão, por vezes também arranja problemas com empresas que nem sabe que são dele...).

No entanto, a produção (no mundo real) do produto "Histórias do Tio Patinhas" é largamente o oposto disso; para começar, ao contrário do "Mickey", o "Tio Patinhas" nem é uma criação do "empresário-empreendedor" Walt Disney, mas de um dos seus empregados, Carl Barks; além disso, grande parte das histórias (e da trama narrativa geral do "Universo do Tio Patinhas") são da responsabilidade... da filial italiana da Disney (as histórias que as pessoas da minha idade leram na infância foram provavelmente quase todas feitas em Itália - exemplo); ou seja, as histórias não só não saíram da cabeça do patrão da empresa, como foram feitas por empregados trabalhando a milhares de quilómetros da sede.

Sobre pequenos empresários, "empreendedores", etc. - II

Ainda acerca disto, volto a levantar a questão que já levantei aqui - se não vamos medir o "empreendedorismo" pela número de empresas/empresários, vamos medi-lo pelo quê? E, se não houver maneira de medir o "empreendedorismo", que valor têm comentários como "temos que ter mais espírito empreendedor"? Afinal, como é que se pode dizer que o que falta a um país é uma coisa que não pode ser medida?

Se se procurar medidas alternativas de "empreendedorismo", acabamos quase sempre por inventar substitutos que já são eles próprios medidas de dinamismo económico (taxa de crescimento do progresso técnico, numero de novas empresas que chegam ao patamar de "X" vendas por ano, etc.) tornando a afirmação "o empreendedorismo é a chave para o crescimento económico" pouco mais que uma tautologia.

E, já agora, repito o que escrevi há 4 anos:

Já agora, se nem todos os trabalhadores por conta própria são "empreendedores", isso não deveria significar que os trabalhadores por conta de outrém também podem ser considerados "empreendedores"? - afinal, nas grandes empresas o desenvolvimento de novos produtos e/ou "estratégias empresariais" é, fundamentalmente, da responsabilidade de assalariados. No entanto, quando no discurso politico se diz "temos que adoptar medidas favoráveis aos empreendedores", isso é sempre usado no sentido de advogar medidas favoráveis aos empresários

Sobre pequenos empresários, "empreendedores", etc.

Um artigo que pode ter algum interesse para esta discussão - Non-pecuniary Benefits of Small Business Ownership [pdf] (editado a 2017/03/20 - este link parece estar morto, mas há outra versão - com ligeiras diferenças - desse artigo aqui), por dois economistas da Universidade de Chicago.

No entanto, este artigo mistura conclusões interessantes com outras que me parecem banais, ou mesmo incorrectas.

A conclusão principal do estudo é que muita gente opta por abrir a sua própria empresa ou trabalhar por conta própria, não com a expectativa de ganhar mais dinheiro do que trabalhando por conta de outrem, mas motivado por considerações não-monetárias como "ser o meu próprio patrão", "trabalhar a partir de casa", "ter um horário flexível" ou "fazer do meu passatempo uma carreira".

Agora, vamos à minha crítica ao paper (questão - porque é que eu estou a criticar um paper desconhecido feito por pessoas que nunca irão saber da minha crítica? Porque é sobre uma questão - a relação entre "empreendedor" e "empresário" - que surge frequentemente, logo partes da minha crítica podem vir a ser reutilizadas para outras discussões).

"To our knowledge, no one has ever put forth a model of small business formation where households care about the non-pecuniary benefi ts of owning a business."

Até é possível que ninguém tenha elaborado um modelo matemático formal, mas a ideia de que algumas pessoas podem derivar um beneficio intrínseco de "ser o seu próprio patrão", não é nenhum novidade - p.ex., já em 1937, Ronald Coase, em "The Nature of the Firm", falava disso; também a 12ª edição "do Samuelson" refere essa hipótese (p. 536). E, se sairmos dos economistas para os historiadores, o que mais encontramos é teses sobre os movimentos socialistas/sindicalistas europeus ou sobre o populismo agrário norte-americano  dizendo algo como "as estatísticas demonstram, nessa época, um aumentos dos rendimentos do [grupo em questão]; provavelmente a força do [movimento em questão] teve mais a ver com um sentimento de perca de independência face às grandes empresas".

"In the absence of non-pecuniary business owners, firms would operate at their natural efficient scales. In our model, this varies directly with the type of good produced. Introducing non-pecuniary benefit ts truncates the distribution of firms in the sense that small and medium scale business cannot compete against the non-pecuniary entrepreneur. Though less efficient, the entrepreneur is willing to work at a lower wage by taking some of total compensation in the form of direct utility  flow. This ef fectively lowers his marginal costs below his competitors." (bolds meus)

Isto talvez seja uma picuinhice, mas mesmo com "benefícios não-monetários" as firmas irão funcionar à escala mais eficiente; se o tal  micro-empresário, que se sente mais feliz com o trabalho que os assalariados das grandes empresas, e por isso está disposto a trabalhar por menos, consegue (mesmo que produza menos por hora) vender mais barato, quer dizer que é mais eficiente. Na verdade, suspeito que se a passagem acima tivesse sido escrita num trabalho por estudantes de economia, teriam sido reprovados (por não perceberem o carácter multifacetado do conceito "de custo")

"In our model where the only reason for small business formation is because of the non-pecuniary bene fits, subsidies to promote small businesses are strictly welfare reducing even if they are funded by lump sum taxes. The reason for this is that the subsidies alter the nature of production toward goods or services that are produced by less efficient small businesses and away from goods and services that are produced by larger firms. The subsidies to small businesses result in too many small and less efficient fi rms."

A mim parece-me que esse efeito dos subsídios às pequenas empresas (ou às grandes, já agora) aconteceria com ou sem "benefícios não-monetários" - excluindo os casos de externalidades, qualquer subsidio a um sector especifico da economia, ao tornar "viáveis" actividades que, à partida, seriam inviáveis, diminui a eficiência da economia. Para falar a verdade, até suspeito que, se existirem fortes "beneficios não-monetários", o efeito dos subsídios é menos grave: se os factores não-monetários pesarem muito nas decisões das pessoas, menos a existência de um subsídio afecta essas decisões; logo menor o efeito "distorcedor" do subsídio.

A linha seguinte talvez explique o raciocínio dos autores: "Any benefit of the subsidy in stimulating certain types of small business which may have true entrepreneurial properties will have to be weighed against the cost of stimulating small business activity for those who are only interested in the non-pecuniary benefits." Pelo que eu percebo, eles são da opinião que os pequenos empresários que são "empreendedores" terão realmente externalidades positivas, mas o que são motivados pelos "benefícios não-monetários" não - mas é isso que vou discutir agora.

O ponto 3.4 do paper (a partir da página 14) chega finalmente à questão relevante - a relação entre "empresário" e "empreendedor". Aí os autores argumentem que usar o número de pequenas empresas como medida de "empreendedorismo" não será o mais correcto, já que grande parte das pequenas empresas são criadas por razões não-monetárias, não inovam, e não têm intenções de crescer.

A mim, parece-me que o único ponto relevante é o "não inovam" (que, realmente, parece ser um conceito muito ligado ao de "empreendedor"); os outros dois pontos parecem-me irrelevantes: porque é que uma empresa ser criada com motivos não-monetários não há de ser "empreendedora"? Por outras palavras, porque é que uma empresa dessas há de ser menos susceptível de "inovar" do que uma criada com o único objectivo de ganhar dinheiro (para falar a verdade, um dos motivos não-monetários referidos - "transformar o passatempo num carreira" - até me parece bastante susceptível de favorecer a entrada em ramos de negócio não-usuais)? Ou seja, a tal oposição entre "empresas empreendedoras" e "empresas criadas por razões não-monetárias" não me parece fazer grande sentido.

Quanto a usar o "crescimento" como medida de "empreendedorismo", também não vejo grande lógica - uma empresa pode crescer sem ser particularmente inovadora: pode-se limitar a abrir novos estabelecimentos repetindo o mesmo modelo; e uma empresa até pode ter um produto ou um modelo de negócio "inovador" mas ficar sempre limitada a um estabelecimento (basta uma actividade não ter economias de escala - ou até ter deseconomias de escala - para não haver nenhuma razão para a empresa crescer, seja ou não "inovadora").

Personalidade e e-mail

Email Stereotypes: What Your Address Says About You (Huffington Post) e You’ve got mail: What your email domain says about you (Hunch Blog):

AOL users are most likely to be overweight women ages 35-64 who have a high school diploma and are spiritual, but not religious. They tend to be politically middle of the road, in a relationship of 10+ years, and have children. AOL users live in the suburbs and haven’t traveled outside their own country. Family is their first priority. AOL users mostly read magazines, have a desktop computer, listen to the radio, and watch TV on 1-3 DVRs in their home. At home, they lounge around in sweats. AOL users are optimistic extroverts who prefer sweet snacks and like working on a team.

Gmail users are most likely to be thin young men ages 18-34 who are college-educated and not religious. Like other young Hunch users, they tend to be politically liberal, single (and ready to mingle), and childless. Gmail users live in cities and have traveled to five or more countries. They’re career-focused and plugged in — they mostly read blogs, have an iPhone and laptop, and listen to music via MP3s and computers (but they don’t have a DVR). At home, they lounge around in a t-shirt and jeans. Gmail users prefer salty snacks and are introverted and entrepreneurial. They are optimistic or pessimistic, depending on the situation.

Hotmail users are most likely to be young women of average build ages 18-34 (and younger) who have a high school diploma and are not religious. They tend to be politically middle of the road, single, and childless. Hotmail users live in the suburbs, perhaps still with their parents, and have traveled to up to five countries. They mostly read magazines and contemporary fiction, have a laptop, and listen to music via MP3s and computers (but they don’t have a DVR). At home, Hotmail users lounge around in a t-shirt and jeans. They’re introverts who prefer sweet snacks and like working on a team. They consider themselves more pessimistic, but sometimes it depends on the situation.

Yahoo! users are most likely to be overweight women ages 18-49 who have a high school diploma and are spiritual, but not religious. They tend to be politically middle of the road, in a relationship of 1-5 years, and have children. Yahoo! users live in the suburbs or in rural areas and haven’t traveled outside their own country. Family is their first priority. They mostly read magazines, are almost equally likely to have a laptop or desktop computer, listen to the radio and cds, and watch TV on 1-2 DVRs in their home. At home, Yahoo! users lounge around in pajamas. They’re extroverts who prefer sweet snacks and like working on a team. Yahoo! users are optimistic or pessimistic, depending on the situation.

Pelos vistos, o estudo não elaborou um perfil dos utilizadores do SAPO (serão pouco frequentes entre o público dos sites em questão?)...

Duelos

Em Defesa Do Duelo, por Pedro Bandeira.

Desigualdade e crises

Inequality, leverage and crises, por Michael Kumhof e Romain Ranciére (VoxEU):

Of the many origins of the global crisis, one that has received comparatively little attention is income inequality. This column provides a theoretical framework for understanding the connection between inequality, leverage and financial crises. It shows how rising inequality in a climate of rising consumption can lead poorer households to increase their leverage, thereby making a crisis more likely.

Convulsões do copyright

"I can't think of a better illustration of the copyright system's absurdity", por Jesse Walker (Reason Hit&Run):

"how a folk song collector wound up as the legal co-author of a Jay-Z diss track"

A "mafia mexicana"

The Mexican Mafia, por Alex Tabarrok:

The Mexican Mafia is a fairly small prison gang (perhaps 150-300 made members) and it has significant operational control only within prisons in Southern California yet the Mexican Mafia is extremely powerful. In fact, the MM taxes hundreds of often larger Southern California street gangs at rates of 10-30% of revenues. How can a prison gang tax street gangs? (...)


The key to the MM’s power is that most drug dealers will sooner or later, usually sooner, end up in prison. Thus, the MM can credibly threaten drug dealers outside of prison with punishment once they are inside prison. Moreover, prison is the only place where members of many different gangs congregate. Thus, by maintaining control of the prison bottleneck, the MM can tax hundreds of gangs.

One of the most interesting aspects of Skarbek’s analysis is that he shows–consistent with Mancur Olson’s stationary bandit theory–that as the MM grew in power it started to provide public goods, i.e. it became a kind of government. Thus, the MM protects taxpayers both in prison and on the street, it produces property rights by enforcing gang claims to territory and it adjudicates disputes, all to the extent that such actions increase tax revenue of course. The MM is so powerful that it often doesn’t even have to use its own enforcers; instead, the MM can issue what amounts to a letter of marque and reprisal, a signal that a non-taxpaying gang is no longer under its protection, and privateers will do the rest. (...)

The Mexican Mafia has much to teach us about crime and governance.

Uma data histórica

A primeira greve geral a uma 5º feira.

Polivalência ou ubiquidade?

Desde a Federação Mundial da Juventude Democrática à Administração Regional de Saúde do Algarve, passando pelo jornal Público (apesar de dificuldades várias, como ser assassinado).