Wednesday, November 29, 2017

Os robots estão-nos a tirar empregos? (post n^n sobre o assunto)

Job Loss in Manufacturing: More Robot Blaming (Center for Economic and Policy Research):

It is striking how the media feel such an extraordinary need to blame robots and productivity growth for the recent job loss in manufacturing rather than trade. We got yet another example of this exercise in a NYT Upshot piece by Claire Cain Miller, with the title "evidence that robots are winning the race for American jobs." The piece highlights a new paper by Daron Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo which finds that robots have a large negative impact on wages and employment.

While the paper has interesting evidence on the link between the use of robots and employment and wages, some of the claims in the piece do not follow. (...)

Actually, the paper doesn't provide any help whatsoever in solving this mystery. Productivity growth in manufacturing has almost always been more rapid than productivity growth elsewhere. Furthermore, it has been markedly slower even in manufacturing in recent years than in prior decades. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, productivity growth in manufacturing has averaged less than 1.2 percent annually over the last decade and less than 0.5 percent over the last five years. By comparison, productivity growth averaged 2.9 percent a year in the half century from 1950 to 2000. (...)

While the piece focuses on the displacement of less educated workers by robots and equivalent technology, it is likely that the areas where displacement occurs will be determined in large part by the political power of different groups. For example, it is likely that in the not distant future improvements in diagnostic technology will allow a trained professional to make more accurate diagnoses than the best doctor. Robots are likely to be better at surgery than the best surgeon. The extent to which these technologies will be be allowed to displace doctors is likely to depend more on the political power of the American Medical Association than the technology itself.

Finally, the question of whether the spread of robots will lead to a transfer of income from workers to the people who "own" the robots will depend to a large extent on our patent laws. In the last four decades, we have made patents longer and stronger. If we instead made them shorter and weaker, or even better relied on open source research, the price of robots would plummet and workers would be better positioned to capture the gains of productivity growth as they had in prior decades. In this story it is not robots who are taking workers' wages, it is politicians who make strong patent laws.

Tuesday, November 28, 2017

Re: Esquerda e Direita (I)

Rui Albuquerque escreveu (há quase dois meses, mas o que era para ser uma pequena resposta foi-se desenvolvendo...) no Delito de Opinião sobre "Esquerda e direita".

Note-se que ele farta-se de escrever passagens clarificando que com "direita" se refere a apenas alguma direita (enquanto com "esquerda" é mesmo a esquerda toda), portanto se calhar o post até seria mais correto chamado de "Esquerda e liberalismo" (já que no fundo não incide sobre a diferença entre a esquerda e a direita, mas entre a esquerda e uma facção - provavelmente até minoritária - da direita).

Mas, de qualquer maneira, fiz no Vias de Facto, uma mistura de resposta e de comentário, ponto por ponto a ponto:

Re: Esquerda e Direita (II)
Re: Esquerda e Direita (III)
Re: Esquerda e Direita (IIIa) - ainda o Estado, a Propriedade e "direitos naturais"
Re: Esquerda e Direita (IV)
Re: Esquerda e Direita (V)
Re: Esquerda e Direita (VI)

[Post publicado no Vias de Facto; podem comentar lá]

Smartphones e capacidades "cognitivas"

Smartphones and Cognition: A Review of Research Exploring the Links between Mobile Technology Habits and Cognitive Functioning, por Henry H. Wilmer, Lauren E. Sherman e Jason M. Chein:

While smartphones and related mobile technologies are recognized as flexible and powerful tools that, when used prudently, can augment human cognition, there is also a growing perception that habitual involvement with these devices may have a negative and lasting impact on users’ ability to think, remember, pay attention, and regulate emotion. The present review considers an intensifying, though still limited, area of research exploring the potential cognitive impacts of smartphone-related habits, and seeks to determine in which domains of functioning there is accruing evidence of a significant relationship between smartphone technology and cognitive performance, and in which domains the scientific literature is not yet mature enough to endorse any firm conclusions. We focus our review primarily on three facets of cognition that are clearly implicated in public discourse regarding the impacts of mobile technology – attention, memory, and delay of gratification – and then consider evidence regarding the broader relationships between smartphone habits and everyday cognitive functioning. Along the way, we highlight compelling findings, discuss limitations with respect to empirical methodology and interpretation, and offer suggestions for how the field might progress toward a more coherent and robust area of scientific inquiry.


[Via Marginal Revolution]

O que me chamou a atenção neste estudo (que, aliás, é um estudo sobre os estudos) é o género de capacidades cognitivas que, pelos vistos, normalmente se estuda a respeito do impacto dos smartphones - atenção, memória e capacidade de diferir a satisfação (quase tudo capacidades, sobretudo a primeira e a última, com uma grande associação a ideias como esforço ou disciplina); nenhuma referência a coisas como rapidez de raciocínio, p.ex. É só a mim que a maneira como esses estudos são feitos (e o que é estudado) me parece ter algum moralismo e uma atitude "estes miúdos de hoje em dia..." (ao concentrarem-se nos efeitos dos smartphones nas capacidades cognitivas sobre as quais mais facilmente se faz juízos de valor moral)?

Sunday, November 26, 2017

Trabalhar "sem incentivos"

No twitter, Carlos Guimarães Pinto escreve "Sem ponta de sarcasmo, há algo que n invejo nos professores: saberem que a sua progressão salarial depende exclusivamente da idade e ambiente político. Deve ser frustrante estar preso num ambiente profissionsl em q o mérito n vale nada" e "Tive um único emprego em que a parte fixa era mais de 80% do salário e onde as hipóteses de ser despedido eram quase nulas. Despedi-me ao fim de 5 meses. Não percebo como alguém aguenta uma vida de trabalho assim, sem incentivos."

Nem sei se isto não irá contra a netiqueta (fazer um post no blogger a comentar post no twitter, que têm mais o estatuto de comentários informais), mas atendendo que eu estou mais ou menos no estatuto de ter um emprego em que a parte fixa é 100% do salário e onde as hipóteses de ser despedido são quase nulas, senti vontade de escrever algo sobre isso, nomeadamente sobre a questão de porque é que algumas pessoas não aguentam uma vida de trabalho assim, e outras sentem-se perfeitamente bem ou até preferem dessa maneira.

Fazendo uma auto-análise, não será difícil perceber porque é que eu gosto de ter hipóteses quase nulas de ser despedido - sendo um caso extremo de personalidade INTP / Enneagrama tipo 5 (e não é preciso alguém acreditar nos modelos teóricos subjacentes a essas classificações para facilmente identificar o tipo de pessoa descrito...), entrevistas de emprego são complicadas para mim, logo um eventual despedimento seria problemático (logo, um emprego "seguro" é vital para mim); pelas mesmas razões, eu provavelmente seria largamente desadequando num cargo de chefia (que é o que normalmente significa "promoção"), logo também seria pouco provável (pelo menos, da perspetiva da boa gestão) que eu fosse promovido a um cargo desses; e depois (e talvez seja isso o principal...) eu ganho mais do que grande parte ou a maior parte das pessoas com quem em me relaciono quotidianamente no trabalho, o que possivelmente (nem que seja a nível do meu subconsciente) me leva a imaginar-me como estando no topo das remunerações - noto que é de pessoas que ganham menos do que eu que surge mais a conversa do "devia-se premiar mais os melhores".

Agora, um ponto de ordem - convém distinguir entre "promoções" e "aumentos salariais" (frequentemente chamadas "progressões", em funcionariopubliquês) - pelo menos para mim, "promoção" é quando alguém vai exercer um cargo mais elevado, enquanto um aumento pode ser simplesmente permanecer no mesmo cargo mas ganhando mais; é que de vez em quando aparecem comentadores a dizer que só na função pública há promoções por antiguidade, mas não há promoções por antiguidade na função público - penso que as promoções na FP sempre foram por concurso, o que durante muitos anos foi automático (e continua largamente a ser no caso dos professores, acho) foram as "progressões", que são exatamente a mesma coisa que as "diuturnidades" que creio que existem também nalgumas empresas privadas (exemplo - pdf).

Mas agora, o ponto do "mérito" valer nada - na verdade, em nenhuma organização as pessoas são promovidas pelo "mérito"; as pessoas são promovidas pela "perceção do mérito", o que é algo ligeiramente diferente (isto para não entrarmos sequer na questão do que significa realmente "mérito"...); isto aliás, também se aplica a outras questões como a das quotas (frequentemente opostas com o argumento "as pessoas devem ser nomeadas pelo mérito"; mas, salvo raríssimas exceções - p.ex., fusões empresariais em que passa a haver duas pessoas para cada cargo e é preciso escolher qual fica - é quase impossível nomear as pessoas para cargos com base no "mérito" porque se as pessoas ainda não desempenham esse cargo, como é que se sabe o seu "mérito"? A mim parece-me que a conversa "as pessoas devem ser nomeadas pelo mérito" na realidade quer dizer "as pessoas devem ser nomeadas pelo mérito que demonstraram noutros cargos e que temos esperança que se vá manifestar também no novo cargo").

Agora, abstraindo da minha experiência pessoal, que é capaz de não ser representativa (eu talvez não seja uma pessoa estatisticamente muito normal), eu diria que o gostar-se ou não dos aumentos salariais derivarem da "perceção do mérito" depende da confiança que alguém tenha em a "perceção do mérito" refletir o "mérito", e sobretudo da sua capacidade em a influenciar: alguém que esteja convencido que é fácil medir-se o mérito achará naturalmente que as pessoas devem ganhar mais pelo mérito; já alguém que veja a medição do mérito como um processo algo aleatório (e há montes de razões para alguém poder achar isso*) preferirá sistemas mais mecânicos e impessoais - e curiosamente acho que ambos os lados considerarão que o "seu" sistema é o que lhes dá maior controlo sobre a sua vida:

- Os que acreditam na medição do mérito acharão que com aumentos baseados no mérito controlam mais a sua vida, porque assim podem fazer alguma coisa para serem promovidos (tentarem trabalhar mais e/ou melhor)

- Os que acreditam que a medição do mérito é largamente aleatória acharão que com aumentos "mecânicos" é que controlam mais a sua vida, porque sabendo quando e que aumentos vão ter, podem melhor planear a sua vida (estilo "no ano 2027 vou ser aumentado, portanto 2023 vai ser o ano ideal para mudar de carro e ao fim de quatro anos e ao fim de quatro anos pagar uma pintura nova"), enquanto aumentos "aleatórios" (isto é, dependentes da opinião de outra pessoa) podem estragar o plano todo e fazê-los sentirem-se como se andassem à deriva numa jangada (há uma cena na série "House. M.D." em que alguém diz ao protagonista "Because when it comes to being in control, Gregory House leaves our faith healer kid in the dust. And that's why religious belief annoys you. Because if the universe operates by abstract rules, you can learn them and you can protect yourself. If a supreme being exists, he can squash you anytime he wants." - um raciocinio semelhante pode levar alguém a preferir um sistema de progressão na carreira baseado em regras abstratas em vez de num "ser supremo" que decide quem é aumentado e quem não é)

*uma poderá ser a pessoa não ter mesmo mérito, mas recusar-se a admiti-lo; todavia poderá haver razão mais benévolas.

Friday, November 24, 2017

Polémica mortal sobre filme indiano?

'Padmavati': Controversy takes a deadly turn as dead body found in Rajasthan (Bombay Times):

The 'Padmavati' controversy doesn't seem to be dying down anytime soon however, we sure didn't see it taking a deadly turn. A Recent report suggests that a dead body was found hanging in Rajasthan's Nahargarh Fort, 20 km near Jaipur. The body was surrounded with slogans on stones that read 'Padmavati' ka virodh (Opposing 'Padmavati') and others reading 'Hum putle nahi jalate, latkate hain' (we don't burn effigies, we kill).

Officers from the Brahmapuri Police Station have been investigating the spot and it is not clear if the case is a murder or a suicide and the identity of the body isn't revealed yet. The protest against the film has been spearheaded by Mahipal Singh Makrana, a member of the Rajput Karni Sena and the organisation has said that they have nothing to do with the recent incident. "This is not our way of protest. I want to tell people not to resort to such methods," Makrana said.
Político indiano pediu decapitação de estrela famosa de Bollywood (SAPO):
Deepika Padukone, uma das atrizes mais populares e bem pagas do cinema indiano conhecido por "Bollywood", que também teve o principal papel feminino em "xXx: O Regresso de Xander Cage" (2017), teve de cancelar compromissos públicos após um político do partido governamental ter apelado para que fosse decapitada.

Suraj Pal Singh Amu, o principal coordenador dos media do Bharatiya Janata Party (Partido do Povo Indiano, BJP), que governa a Índia, ofereceu uma recompensa equivalente a 1,23 milhões de euros pelas cabeças da atriz e também de Sanjay Leela Bhansali, realizador do filme "Padmavati".
A respeito disso, alguém escreve "So glad we've finally reached the point where random people are being killed over dumb Bollywood movies in India"

Um pouco de contexto: Padmavati_(film)#Controversy e Shri Rajput Karni Sena

Thursday, November 23, 2017

"Eu sou um desorganizado que não sei gerir dinheiro"

É o que, implicitamente, dizem os empresários que preferem pagar os subsídios em duodécimos e os empregados que preferem receber tudo por inteiro em junho e novembro.

[Post publicado no Vias de Facto - podem comentar lá]

Wednesday, November 22, 2017

Diferentes formas de ver a "liberdade económica"

Scott Sumner refere que em tempos «wrote a paper that looked at several definitions of neoliberalism, and found that what I called "egalitarian neoliberalism" was especially closely correlated with civic virtue. This model was based on the various indices of economic freedom, with the sign on size of government inverted (so that bigger government was a plus, not a minus as in the typical economic freedom indices). For example, the (high trust) Nordic countries gravitate toward models that combine free markets and large government.»

Isso faz-me lembrar três coisas:

- A minha tentativa de operacionalizar a teoria de Daron Acemoglu e James Robinson sobre as instituições extrativas e inclusivas (esse índice de liberdade económica  invertendo o sinal do tamanho do governo parece tal e qual o que eu conclui que eram as "instituições económicas inclusivas")

- A minha hipótese de que culturas que valorizam mais o raciocinio lógico-abstrato do que os relacionamentos inter-pessoais tendem a ter "instituições inclusivas".

- E, finalmente, a minha outra hipótese de que se numa sociedade as pessoas têm fama de serem frias, fechadas, distantes e reservadas, muito provavelmente será uma sociedade com alto "capital social", com muita participação cívica e muitas associações voluntárias.

Como é que isso tudo se encaixa? Se as tais culturas mais lógicas-abstratas do que interpessoais forem também as com mais "capital social", possivelmente serão também as com mais "virtude cívica", e por outro lado serão também as com "instituições (mais) inclusivas" (que eu entretanto defini como, na economia, sendo uma combinação de liberdade micro-económica com altos impostos e despesas públicas - ou seja, o "egalitarian neoliberalism" de Sumner).

É verdade que não sei bem exatamente o que Sumner quer dizer com "virtude cívica" (provavelmente explica no paper que ele linka), mas não é difícil imaginar como uma atitude mais "lógica-abstrata" do que "inter-pessoal" possa levar a um comportamento "virtuoso": parece-me o género de atitude que leve mais o individuo a interiorizar um conjunto de regras (que, atenção, podem não coincidir com as leis do seu país ou as normas maioritárias na sua sociedade) e a segui-las rigidamente (tal como se estivesse a resolver um problema matemático), enquanto uma atitude mais "inter-pessoal" desemboca facilmente numa cultura de "jeitinhos", cunhas e "cada caso é um caso".

Sunday, November 19, 2017

Os estudos sobre a violência nos jogos de computador

Qual o principal factor que determina a probabilidade de um estudo sobre os efeitos da violência nos jogos de computador ser citado, tanto na comunicação social, como em outros estudos subsequentes?

For Video Games, Bad News Is Good News: News Reporting of Violent Video Game Studie, por Copenhaver Allen, Mitrofan Oana, and Ferguson Christopher J.. (Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking):

News coverage of video game violence studies has been critiqued for focusing mainly on studies supporting negative effects and failing to report studies that did not find evidence for such effects. These concerns were tested in a sample of 68 published studies using child and adolescent samples. Contrary to our hypotheses, study effect size was not a predictor of either newspaper coverage or publication in journals with a high-impact factor. However, a relationship between poorer study quality and newspaper coverage approached significance. High-impact journals were not found to publish studies with higher quality. Poorer quality studies, which tended to highlight negative findings, also received more citations in scholarly sources. Our findings suggest that negative effects of violent video games exposure in children and adolescents, rather than large effect size or high methodological quality, increase the likelihood of a study being cited in other academic publications and subsequently receiving news media coverage.

Thursday, November 16, 2017

Os perigos dos sistemas para bloquear websites

New EU law prescribes website blocking in the name of “consumer protection”, por Julia Reda (deputada ao Parlamento Europeu pelo Partido Pirata alemão):

Today, the European Parliament passed the Consumer Protection Cooperation regulation. Unfortunately, it contains an overreachinggeneral website blocking provision. Additionally, consumer protection improvements were watered down or removed completely in last-minute trilogue negotiations with the Council.

According to the new rules, national consumer protection authorities can order any unspecified third party to block access to websites without requiring judicial authorisation.

This forces internet access providers to create a website blocking infrastructure, which risks being abused later on for any number of other purposes, including censorship. To give a recent example,independence-related websites were blocked in Catalunya just weeks ago. These actions could only be taken so quickly because website blocking infrastructure had previously been put in place for other purposes, such as barring access to sites involving copyright infringement.

Wednesday, November 15, 2017

O mito da superpopulação muçulmana

The Muslim Overpopulation Myth That Just Won’t Die, por Krithika Varagur (The Atlantic):

The trope of Muslim overpopulation is reliably powerful anywhere in the world where there is a sizable Muslim immigrant or minority population, from India to Western Europe.

Hindu nationalists often fan anxiety about Muslim population growth; the proportion of Muslims in India grew about 0.8 percent between 2001 and 2011, to 14.2 percent. “If this remains the situation, one should forget about their existence in one’s own country by 2025,” said the leader of a major Hindu nationalist organization last year. But the fertility gap between Muslims and Hindus in India is narrowing fast, and the greatest birthrate disparities are between states, not religions: Hindu women in the very poor state of Bihar have about two more children each than Muslim women in more developed Andhra Pradesh.

Similar concerns echo across countries like France, Germany, the U.K., and the Netherlands. Although Muslims make up less than 10 percent of the total population in each of these countries, perceived overpopulation has been at the center of anti-immigration discourse. About 7.5 percent of France is Muslim, yet on average French people believe Muslims constitute about one in three people in the country. Although Muslim women in Western Europe do currently have more children than their non-Muslim counterparts, research shows that European Muslims’ fertility rate is also declining much faster, so their fertility rates will likely converge over time. (However, in this context, fertility isn’t the only issue; a wave of Muslim immigration over the past few years has reinforced some Europeans’ concerns about Muslim population growth.)

Why does the overpopulation myth persist worldwide, even though it’s typically demonstrably false (like in Burma) or nowhere near the epidemic that its proponents assert (like in Europe and India)? It’s true that the global Muslim population is growing, and fast. But it’s not growing at the same speed across regions. And the trope seems to have the most power not where Muslim populations are actually growing the fastest—like sub-Saharan Africa—but in places where they are culturally distinct minorities.

There’s nothing inherent in Islam to link it to higher fertility—in fact, it’s not a particularly natalist, or pro-birth, religion. Eight of the nine classic schools of Islamic law permit contraception. Many Muslim states, including Pakistan, have supported family planning. (...)

The claim about Muslim overpopulation falls apart in fascinating ways when examined more closely. The fastest fertility drop in modern history happened in the Islamic theocracy of Iran. In 1950, Iranian women had about seven children each; today they have about 1.68, fewer than Americans. What changed? In 1989, the country’s leaders realized that the the high birth rate was straining the young republic. In response, the Supreme Leader issued fatwas encouraging birth control and contraception, and the Health Ministry propagated family planning counseling, rural health centers, and contraceptive distribution across the country. (...)

In the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, Indonesia, fertility rates dropped between the 1960s and the 1990s, from about 5.6 children per woman to 2.3, as the Suharto dictatorship instituted a vigorous, centralized family planning program and made improvements to girls’ education. Those government services were decentralized after democracy came to the archipelago in 1998 and, predictably, fertility rates have been creeping up again. Today, Indonesia’s majority-Christian but less developed eastern provinces have a higher birthrate than the more developed, Muslim-majority western ones—a testament to the correlation between economic development and fertility.
Eu suspeito que a ideia de que os muçulmanos terão um crescimento populacional brutal é também o resultado da reação de algumas pessoas "com desafios a matemática" à poliginia entre entre os muçulmanos - já vi cartoons na internet comparando uma família ocidental com um homem, uma mulher e um filho com uma família islâmica com um homem, quatro mulheres e quatro filhos por cada mulher, com a mensagem implícita que enquanto as famílias ocidentais produzem um filho, as islâmicas produzem 16; também já vi em blogues islamofóbicos, a respeito das estatísticas da taxa de fertilidade dos muculmanos, comentários estilo "seria bom saber se isso é por mulher ou por família" (o que só faz sentido se eles estiverem a pensar em famílias com várias mulheres reprodutoras). Mas, claro, a ideia que a poliginia leva a um elevado crescimento demográfico ("como têm muitas mulheres, têm muitos filhos") é idiota - por uma razão elementar: em princípio por cada homem muçulmano com 4 mulheres há 3 homens muçulmanos sem mulher nenhum, pelo que no agregado isso não tem efeito quase nenhum (não será exatamente assim porque haverá alguns casamentos entre homens muçulmanos e mulheres não-muçulmanas - e também o inverso, contudo suspeito que serão menos os casos - mas suspeito que no conjunto representam pouco).

A ideia de que os homens terem muitas mulheres contribui para o crescimento demográfico parece feita a pensar num mundo imaginário em que haveria uma abundância quase infinita de mulheres e seriam os homens (mais exatamente, o número de filhos por homem) o fator determinante para o crescimento da população.

Monday, November 13, 2017

Império Romano versus Alta Idade Média

Razib Khan: The bigger question that looms in the background though is would it have been better to be a median Roman citizen or a median subject of a Dark Age warlord? I don’t have a strong opinion on this, especially when it comes to the ability to consume above subsistence. It seems likely that the far worst treatment of slaves in places like Sicily than anything serfs were subject to (though serfdom only truly came into its own during the end of the Dark Ages) should be weighed in the calculus, but the Roman peace was also a genuine peace. The petty conflicts persistent at a local level in the Dark Ages may have made the life of a typical peasant less secure than for Roman citizens.

Friday, November 10, 2017

Daniel R. Carreiro - Utopía realista del Anarcocapitalismo

O movimento espanhol ancap continua a expandir-se (tendo nascido com Huerta de Soto e Miguel Anxo Bastos)










Thursday, November 09, 2017

Tuesday, November 07, 2017

Algo se passa no "Reino"

Reformar a Arábia Saudita?, por Francisco Sarsfield Cabral (2017/11/07)



Visões sobre a Revolução de Outubro

Contra (ou pelo menos contra os bolcheviques):

October 1917 – Socialism’s greatest setback?, por John Medhurst (New Socialist)


The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control, por Maurice Brinton

The Kronstadt uprising of 1921/The Kronstadt Commune, por Ida Mett

The unknown revolution, 1917-1921, por Volin

Teses Sobre o Bolchevismo, por Helmut Wagner

An Anarchist FAQ - Appendix - The Russian Revolution 


A favor (criticando aspetos do que veio a seguir):

The Russian Revolution [1918], por Rosa Luxemburgo (versão pdf em português)

The Workers' Opposition [1921], por Alexandra Kollontai

Manifesto of the Workers' Group of the Russian Communist Party [1923], por Gavril Miasnikov

The Revolution Betrayed [1936], por Leon Trotsky (versão pdf em português)

[Quase todos estão na categoria de textos que até há uns só se encontrariam na livrarias de livros usados naquelas ruas que vão dar ao Bairro Alto, em Lisboa, ou então nalgumas bancadas da Feira do Livro]

[Post publicado no Vias de Facto; podem comentar lá]


Thursday, November 02, 2017

Em defesa da mudança de hora

Por qualquer razão (eu suspeito que tem a ver com as alterações climáticas), este ano muita gente decidiu embirrar com a mudança de hora.

Alguns dizem que não se percebe o porquê da mudança de hora, que não se vê quais os benefícios, etc. Na verdade, não é preciso pensar muito para perceber a razão de ser da mudança de hora - na Primavera e no Verão os dias são maiores que no Outono e no Inverno, logo se na Primavera/Verão as pessoas se levantassem, começassem a trabalhar, etc. à mesma hora que no Outono/Inverno, ia haver horas de Sol que se desperdiçariam, porque muita gente ainda estaria a dormir já com o Sol alto; assim, muitos países (uns durante alguma das Guerra Mundiais, outros durante a crise do petróleo dos anos 70) institucionalizaram a regra de, na Primavera/Verão, adiantar-se uma hora o relógio face à hora correspondente ao seu fuso horário (e eu pessoalmente acho uma ótima ideia, porque assim no Verão posso sair do trabalho e ainda ir para a praia durante algumas horas).

Claro que já percebi que a maior parte (todas?) das pessoas que são contra a mudança de hora não são contra ter sido criada a regra de adiantar os relógios na Primavera; defendem é que devia ser permanente e que os relógios deveriam ficar uma hora adiantados o ano inteiro, em vez de regressarem à hora solar no Outono.

Mas acho mesmo assim justificaria-se a mudança de hora: vamos lá ver, as pessoas que preferiam permanecer no horário de Verão é porque preferem ir trabalhar ainda de noite e ter mais uma hora de Sol ao fim do dia; mas, se é assim, no Verão também estariam dispostas a ir trabalhar ainda de noite para ter mais uma hora de Sol ao fim do dia (provavelmente ainda mais - há mais coisas que se podem fazer ao fim do dia no Verão que no Inverno; e ir trabalhar ainda de noite é provavelmente mais incómodo no tempo frio do que no quente; e no Verão a partir de certa altura nem há o problema das crianças terem que ir para a escola de noite) - ou seja, se no Inverno se continuasse a usar a "hora de Verão" (1 hora adiantada face à hora solar), então faria sentido no Verão começar a usar uma "hora de Verão 2.0" (2 horas adiantada face à hora solar - continuando-se a entrar no trabalho ainda de noite), e continuaria-se à mesma a mudar periodicamente a hora.

Em resumo, no Verão há mais horas de Sol tanto de manhã (a aurora é mais cedo) como de tarde (o pôr-do-sol é mais tarde), e a mudança de hora (seja qual for a hora base) é uma maneira de atirar para o fim do dia - onde pode ser usado para alguma coisa - todo esse tempo extra de luz natural.

Wednesday, November 01, 2017

O Halloween como celebração católica

My High Holy Day, por John Zmirak:

All the decorations are up, folks are frantically shopping and preparing, and the anticipation is almost killing me as I await the brightest, best moment of the whole liturgical year: Halloween, of course.

As far back as I can remember, this feast far outclassed Christmas on my personal calendar. No matter that Santa brought piles of gifts like the board game version of The Six Million Dollar Man, the Shrunken Head Machine, or yet one more encyclopedia set which I had begged for. None of this could compare with the fistfuls of crunchy loot that strangers dropped into our sacks, as we trooped up and down the stairwells of our tenements. What made those gobs of candy glow with a sinister excitement was the threat that some might be – must be! – laced with deadly poison, our apples stuffed with razor blades, by evil old crones who were eager to kill off the children. (...)

Halloween provokes contention among American Christians to this day. Some homeschooling friends of mine confessed to me that they felt torn over whether or not to let their son dress up and go trick-or-treating; their Protestant friends kept telling them that this holiday was pagan or even Satanic. And given their theology, you can see their point: The souls of the dead are either in Heaven – in which case they're not walking the earth and need not be appeased, represented, mocked, or even commemorated, depending on which reading you give to the way we Catholics appropriated old pagan customs that marked this time of year – or else they're in Hell, and not worth remembering. Anyone who's dead and suffering deserves it, and will go on suffering forever. There's no sense in attracting his attention. (...)

It's our very comfort with the queerness and creepiness of the whole soul-body mystery that marks the Catholic faith off from its closest competitors. I grew up loving The Addams Family, without knowing quite why, until one day as an adult I realized: These people are an aristocratic, trad-Catholic homeschooling family trapped in a sterile Protestant suburb! Shunning the utilitarianism and conformity that surrounds them, they face the Grim Reaper with rueful good cheer, in a Gothic home stock full of relics. Indeed, I think I might have spotted several Addamses at the indult parish in New York City…

Monday, October 16, 2017

Modelos de propriedade alternativos (II)

Labour's Alternative Models of Ownership Report (New Socialist):

Today Labour launch a report, Alternative Models of Ownership, commissioned by Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell and Shadow Secretary of State for Business and Industrial Strategy Rebecca Long-Bailey, that could mark a major milestone in the development of the Corbyn project and its ambitious attempt to re-make the British left. The report, authored by a group of theorists and practitioners at the cutting edge of ‘new economics’ thinking in the UK, potentially provides the basis for the most far-reaching, radical, yet practical, economic strategy to be argued for within the Labour Party in forty years. In a political landscape long characterised by triviality and a sullen lack of imagination, the authors of the report – as well as McDonnell and Long-Bailey – deserve enormous credit and have further demonstrated that it is the left that is producing the only serious, grown-up ideas for tackling our deepening social, economic, and ecological crises. The ideas contained in the report manage to be both justifiably pessimistic about the consequences of continued business-as-usual for the vast majority of people and for the environment, while also demonstrating powerful optimism regarding our capacity to change things for the better – for the many, not the few. (...)

In considerable detail, the report sets out the practicality and necessity of a shift to a variety of alternative forms of ownership and control of productive enterprises, including co-operatives, municipal and locally-led ownership forms, and finally – and most ambitiously – new democratic forms of national ownership. Ultimately, Alternative Models of Ownership is a remarkable document to be circulating at the highest levels of a major political party, combining a sober and plausible practicality with a profound radicalism in demanding a new socialist political economy that goes beyond nostalgia for a reheated, golden-age social democracy (...)

More generally, the report also contains certain policy themes that have not always been the preserve of the left – or at least of the left exclusively. Such themes include co-operatives, which formed a large part of the Big Society agenda; greater devolution of budgets to regions and councils, which superficially parallels both the “Northern Powerhouse” and the reason given for the support of some right-wing Labour council leaders for Liz Kendall’s 2015 leadership bid; a concern with automation and Unconditional Basic Income, which have interested figures like Tom Watson and Jonathan Reynolds; and a suspicion of how far states subject to the discipline of globalised capitalism can redistribute that underpinned Ed Miliband’s “predistribution” agenda (...).

[Via A Very Public Sociologist]

Diga-se, já agora, que a a análise do New Socialist ao documento dos Trabalhistas parece-me ser maior (e talvez mais aprofundado) que o documento propriamente dito...

Modelos de propriedade alternativos

Alternative Models of Ownership[PDF], documento do Partido Trabalhista britânico sobre diferentes formas de organização empresarial altertnativas ao modelo capitalista típico:

The economic system in Britain, in its current guise, has a number of fundamental structural flaws that undermine economic strength and societal well-being. The predominance of private property ownership has led to a lack of long-term investment and declining rates of productivity, undermined democracy, left regions of the country economically forgotten, and contributed to increasing levels inequality and financial insecurity. Alternative forms of ownership can fundamentally address these problems.

These issues are all the more pronounced given the increasing levels of automation in our economy. Automation has an emancipatory potential for the country’s population, but the liberating possibilities of automation can only be realised – and the threats of increased unemployment and domination of capital over labour only countered – through new models of collective ownership that ensure that the prospective benefits of automation are widely shared and democratically governed.

Cooperative ownership has the ability to increase employment stability and increase productivity levels, as well as making firms more democratic. To support the expansion of cooperatives in the UK it is necessary to improve their access to finance, and examples from Italy and Spain point in the direction necessary to achieve this. Cooperatives can further be supported by national legislation and a re-worked government procurement policy.

Municipal and locally-led ownership can improve service provision and guarantee that economic prosperity is not concentrated in certain regions of the country. A variety of policies, including place-based budgets, increased powers being handed to local authorities, and the relocation of various major institutions outside of London can foster this type of ownership.

National ownership of certain industries promotes long-term planning of the economy, helps to provide modernising infrastructure, quality health and social care, and to combat climate change. Examples around the world point to the positive contribution of national ownership, but in the UK national state ownership has historically tended to be too centralised, with power in the hands of a private and corporate elite. To improve national ownership in the UK requires taking measures to increase the democratic accountability of state ownership.

Wednesday, October 11, 2017

A "aversão à perda" vista por uma óptica mais clássica

[38] A Better Explanation Of The Endowment Effect, por Joe Simmons (via Marginal Revolution):

Weaver and Frederick’s theory is simple: Selling and buying prices reflect two concerns. First, people don’t want to sell the mug for less, or buy the mug for more, than their own value of it. Second, they don’t want to sell the mug for less, or buy the mug for more, than the market price. This is because people dislike feeling like a sucker. [2]

To see how this produces the endowment effect, imagine you are willing to pay $1 for the mug and you believe it usually sells for $3. As a buyer, you won’t pay more than $1, because you don’t want to pay more than it’s worth to you. But as a seller, you don’t want to sell for as little as $1, because you’ll feel like a chump selling it for much less than it is worth. [3]. Thus, because there’s a gap between people’s perception of the market price and their valuation of the mug, there’ll be a large gap between selling ($3) and buying ($1) prices.
Eu por mim dispensava as partes do "feeling like a sucker" e do "feel like a chump" - esse comportamento pode ser explicado assumindo apenas agentes racionais procurando maximizar o rendimento (e que portanto não vão vender por 2 euros algo que estão convencidos que poderão vender por 3).

A Reference Price Theory of the EndowmentEffect[pdf], por Ray Weaver e Shane Frederick (Journal of Marketing Reasearch, vol. XLIX, outubro de 2012, pp. 696–707):
The common finding that selling prices exceed buying prices (the so-called endowment effect) is typically explained by the assumptions that consumers evaluate potential transactions with respect to their current holdings and that the owners of a good regard its potential loss to be more significant than nonowners regard its potential acquisition. In contrast to this “pain-of-losing” account, the authors propose that the endowment effect reflects a reluctance to trade on terms that appear unfavorable with respect to salient reference prices. In six experiments (and eight more summarized in appendixes), the authors show that manipulations that reduce the gap between valuations and reference prices reduce or eliminate the endowment effect. These results suggest that the endowment effect is often best construed as an aversion to bad deals rather than an aversion to losing possessions.

Tuesday, October 10, 2017

Economia comportamental e conservadorismo social

Why Conservatives Should Celebrate Thaler's Nobel, por Tyler Cowen:

Richard Thaler, winner of the 2017 Nobel Memorial Prize in economics, is not usually considered to be a right-of-center thinker. His major idea in “Nudge,” co-authored with my fellow Bloomberg View contributor Cass Sunstein, however, is the most significant contribution to conservative thought in a generation.

As the debate usually proceeds, advocates of nudging call upon the government to structure “choice architecture” to produce better decisions. If you sign up for a pension plan with your employer, perhaps the default option should be the maximum contribution to a savings plan; in turn, the enrollee must check a box to receive a different option. Choice is still present, but the employer (or the government) is suggesting that people make a particular choice. Such practices have become widespread, and the British government has created an entire “nudge unit.”

As this debate has unfolded, many conservatives and libertarians have been very critical of Thaler and Sunstein. They describe nudging as manipulation, and perhaps one step down the road to an Orwellian future based on surveillance and subtle behavioral control. When I look around though, I mostly see the nudge idea in service of the ends of social conservatives. (...)

Consider marriage as a longstanding form of the nudge idea. Divorce, of course, is possible, but our government doesn’t allow marriage contracts that automatically expire after 5 years, or 10. That’s a nudge encouraging people to stay married, and a good one for the most part. (...)

Another conservative nudge comes in immigration policy. Throughout much of the 20th century, there wasn’t much, if any, barrier to people crossing from Mexico into the U.S. These days, there is an active Border Patrol. That said, Mexicans can buy false papers or overstay their visas if they don’t wish to hazard what is now a fairly dangerous border crossing experience. Even if we build President Donald Trump’s wall, these basic facts will not change: Mexicans have the option of entering illegally, but they must engage in considerable planning and incur some expense to do so. They are nudged to stay home, although a choice remains. (...)

An especially controversial conservative nudge is all the policy steps and regulatory restrictions and funding cuts that make it harder for women to get abortions. Many Americans must now travel a considerable distance to reach a qualified abortion provider, in some cases hundreds of miles. The cost is discouraging. And the greater inconvenience widens the gap of time between decision and final outcome, perhaps inducing some women to change their minds or simply let the plan go unfulfilled. Yet it is still possible to get an abortion, albeit with greater effort.(...)

I find it striking that nudge theorists usually market the idea using relatively “liberal” examples, such as improving public services. How much we view nudge as freedom-enhancing or as a sinister manipulation may depend on the context in which the nudge is placed. Neither conservatives nor liberals should be so quick to condemn or approve of nudge per se.

We should also consider that the politically relevant alternative to nudge may indeed be violence, rather than freedom of choice. That tends to make the nudge idea look better, though perhaps not in a way that social liberals should feel totally comfortable with.

Vagamente relacionado, um artigo que escrevi há uns tempos - Economia, política e os "agentes racionais", onde alego que assumir que muitas das decisões humanas são irracionais é muito mais fácil de enquadrar num programa de direita do que de esquerda.

Friday, October 06, 2017

Faleceu Pedro Romano (do blogue Desvio Colossal)

Morreu Pedro Romano, analista do Jornal Económico

O ex-jornalista, consultor e analista económico Pedro Romano faleceu esta quinta-feira em Braga, onde residia, segundo fonte próxima da família. Pedro Romano completava 32 anos este mês. A causa da morte ainda não é conhecida.

Licenciado e mestre em Ciências da Comunicação pela Universidade do Minho, Pedro Romano iniciou a sua carreira no jornalismo económico em 2008, tendo sido jornalista do “Diário Económico” e do “Jornal de Negócios”, especializando-se na área de macroeconomia. Foi também assessor económico do Grupo Parlamentar do CDS e da Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos, entre outras entidades. Atualmente trabalhava como consultor e, embora estivesse afastado do jornalismo, era colaborador permanente do Jornal Económico, assinando semanalmente a coluna “Radar Económico”. Alimentava também o blogue Desvio Colossal.

A profundidade da sua análise, juntamente com a fineza e a lucidez dos seus raciocínios, faziam de Pedro Romano um dos mais promissores jovens analistas económicos em Portugal. E o seu sentido de humor apurado vai fazer muita falta a todos aqueles que tiveram o privilégio de o conhecer e de trabalhar com ele.
É daquelas pessoas que, sem o conhecer pessoalmente, é quase como se o conhecesse, de tão habituado que estava a "falar" com ele nos nossos blogues e no Facebook, durante os últimos dez anos.

Monday, September 11, 2017

A economia de serviços e a pós-verdade

Economic Roots of Post-Truth Politics, por Chris Dillow:

Here’s a conjecture: the rise of “post-truth” politics (defined by the OED as a process whereby “objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than emotional appeals”) is in part the product of deindustrialization.

What I mean is that in manufacturing, facts defeat emotions and opinions. If your steel cracks, or your bottles leak or your cars won’t start, all your hopes and fancy beliefs are wrong. Truth trumps opinion.

Contrast this with sales occupations. In these, opinion beats facts. If customers think a shit sandwich is great food, it’ll sell regardless of facts. And conversely, good products won’t sell if customers think they’re rubbish. Opinion trumps truth.

(Finance is a mix of these. In trading and asset management, beliefs are constantly defeated by cold hard facts. In asset gathering, sales and investor relations, however, bullshit works.)

Isn’t it therefore possible that a shift from manufacturing to other occupations will contribute to a decline in respect for facts and greater respect for opinions, however ill-founded? In 1966 – when employment in UK manufacturing peaked – 29.2% of the workforce were in manufacturing. This meant that millions more heard tales from fathers, husbands and friends about how brute facts had fouled up their day. A culture of respect for facts was thus inculcated. Today, however, only 7.8% of the workforce is in manufacturing and many more are in bullshit jobs. This is an environment less conducive to a deference to facts.

Friday, August 25, 2017

Esquerda, direita e liberdade de expressão

Ou, mais exatamente, "liberals", "conservatives" e liberdade de expressão.

Most liberals and smart people want racists to be allowed to speak, por Razib Khan:

Over the past year or so there have been many worries that liberals are backing off from their support for free speech. Even mainstream figures such as Howard Dean have started to chant the mantra “hate speech is not free speech”. And then you have op-eds from professors such as When ‘free speech’ becomes a political weapon.

But whenever I look at the General Social Survey I see no great change in support for free speech in terms of the patterns. Perhaps something has changed in the year 2017, but I think what we are seeing are vocal and motivated minorities who are drowning out liberal (in the classical sense) majorities. (...)

What the above plot shows is that liberals support free speech for both racists and Muslim radicals. Conservatives are more skeptical of free speech for both groups, but especially the Muslims. You might be curious why moderates seem so skeptical of free speech. That’s because on average moderates are less intelligent than people at the ideological poles, and the less intelligent are generally less supportive of heterodox speech


Friday, August 11, 2017

Sobre discriminação laboral

Se houver a perceção (verdadeira ou falsa, a curto prazo tanto faz) que 55% dos membros do grupo A e 45% dos membros do grupo B são bons numa determinada tarefa, as empresas vão procurar contratar (se não tiverem mais informação adicional sobre cada potencial trabalhador) 100% de elementos do grupo A para desempenhar essa tarefa.

Isto possivelmente aplica-se a outros cenários além do trabalho, mas é neste que me parece mais fácil chegar a essa conclusão.

[Post publicado no Vias de Facto; podem comentar lá]

O caso James Damore versus Google

Este caso deve provocar sentimentos contraditórios a muita gente.

James Damore has an 'above decent' chance of winning his legal case against Google (Business Insider):

James Damore, the man fired by Google after he published a manifesto that suggested women may have a disadvantage in tech because of their biology, may well prevail in the legal case he has filed against his former employer.

That's because he filed his complaint against Alphabet (Google's corporate parent) under a provision of the National Labor Relations Act that protects workers' rights activists. Under that provision, Damore's complaint will not be about whether he was discriminated against as a white person, a man, or a conservative, or whether the company had a right to let him go as an "at-will" worker.

Rather, the provision governs what workers are allowed to talk about in the workplace about pay, conditions, promotions, and other practices. The law was crafted to protect the right of union organisers to discuss pay rates with their colleagues, and more recently to protect anyone asking questions at work about who gets paid what, and why.

On that basis, he has a fighting chance, according to Valerie Sharpe, a labor lawyer based in the San Francisco area. (...)

Of course, the irony here is that if Damore wins, it could be regarded as a big victory for conservatives who work in tech, though the win would strengthen the kind of workers' rights that are traditionally the focus of the left.

Wednesday, August 09, 2017

O socialismo de Chris Dillow

My Socialism, por Chris Dillow:

Looking at critics of Venezuela makes me feel like intelligent religious believers when confronted with some new atheists: they’re attacking nothing I believe in. The shortcomings of the Chavez-Maduro government in no way whatsoever undermine my conception of socialism.

What is my conception? You might think I’m going to set out my blueprint of a socialist Utopia. You’d be missing the point. Capitalism was not the conscious design of a single mind, but rather it evolved. The same should be true for socialism.

For me, socialism is a system which fulfils, as far as possible, three principles.

One is real freedom. Oliver Kamm praises a liberal order as one in which – in contradistinction to state socialism - “embraces value pluralism, in which citizens are free to pursue the goals that matter to them.” I share this ideal, but I fear that capitalism does not sufficiently achieve it. Under capitalism, millions of us are compelled to work in often oppressive and coercive conditions. Our goals are thwarted. Perhaps Marx’s biggest gripe with capitalism was not its injustice but its alienation; the fact it prevents us from pursuing our goals.

In this context, a basic income is crucial. It would enable people to pursue their own lives. It would empower Cory Doctorow’s walkaways.

A second desiderata is voice. As Phil says, “socialism involves a deeper, more thoroughgoing democratisation of social life.” At the political level, this requires institutions of deliberative (pdf) democracy – not simply imbecile “speak your branes” referenda. At the economic level, it requires worker democracy. (...)

The third value is equality. I don’t mean here any particular Gini coefficient. Instead, what matters are two things.

One is how inequalities arise. I’ve no problem with some people getting rich if people freely reward them for good service – Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain argumenthas no force for me – although luck egalitarianism justifies them paying some extra tax. (...)

The other is their effects. Inequalities of income spill over into inequalities of respect and political power. To me, this is unacceptable. (...)

What role would the state play in this?

I suspect it wouldn’t be a large one. We Marxists are wary of the state simply because it is often used for reactionary and repressive ends. A big state can be (and is) captured by capitalists. Nationalization, for example, cannot be sufficient for socialism simply because it can be reversed. Marxism is in some respects verydifferent from social democracy.

Instead, a big role for the state is to facilitate the transition to socialism, by encouraging socialistic institutions. Some call this accelerationism, othersinterstitial (pdf) transformation. Again, a basic income is crucial here: it enables people to walk away from oppressive capitalism (if they choose) and into cooperative ventures or self-employment. Also, the state could help spread coops by encouraging public sector mutuals and using procurement policies to favour them and penalize hierarchical firms. (...)

The general principle here is to empower people to reject exploitative capitalism (if they want). This would so squeeze profits that capitalists would have to transform into more egalitarian forms or die. (The state is, of course, needed to smooth this process).

As for the place of markets in all this, it should be what it is now - a narrow technical matter: does this particular market work and if not can we make it do so? It’s perfectly possible – I think desireable – to have freeish markets without (pdf)capitalism.

Personally, my socialism would have a perhaps big role for entrepreneurship – just not the sort that rips people off.

It should be obvious to everyone that this vision of socialism is massively different from that of a centrally planned dictatorship.

Of course, this vision of socialism differs from many others’, though it should be compatible with many of them: I’d hope there’s a parallel between it and Robert Nozick’s framework for utopia.

What all this is definitely not, of course, is statism, nor the illiberalism of Maduro’s government. Maybe the tragedy of Venezuela brings Jeremy Corbyn’s judgment into question. But it tells us nothing about my sort of socialism.

Thursday, August 03, 2017

O autoritário e elitista Alexander Hamilton

The Hamilton Hustle, por Matt Stoller:

AS DONALD TRUMP SETTLES INTO THE WHITE HOUSE, elites in the political class are beginning to recognize that democracy is not necessarily a permanent state of political organization. “Donald Trump’s candidacy is the first time American politics has left me truly afraid,” wrote Vox cofounder Ezra Klein just before the election. Andrew Sullivan argued in New York magazine that American democracy is susceptible, “in stressful times, to the appeal of a shameless demagogue.” Paul Krugman wrote an entire column on why republics end, citing Trump’s violations of political norms. But if you want to understand the politics of authoritarianism in America, the place to start is not with Trump, but with the cool-kid Founding Father of the Obama era, Alexander Hamilton. (...)

To assert Hamilton disliked democracy is not controversial. The great historian Henry Adams described an evening at a New York dinner, when Hamilton replied to democratic sentiment by banging the table and saying, “Your people, sir—your people is a great beast!” Hamilton’s recommendation to the Constitutional Convention, for instance, was to have a president for life, and to explicitly make that president not subject to law. (...)

Indeed, most of Hamilton’s legacy is astonishingly counter-democratic. His central role in founding both the financial infrastructure of Wall Street and a nascent military establishment (which supplanted the colonial system of locally controlled democratic militias) was rooted in his self-appointed crusade to undermine the ability of ordinary Americans to govern themselves. We should be grateful not that Hamilton structured the essential institutions of America to fit his vision, but that he failed to do so. Had he succeeded, we would probably be living in a military dictatorship.

Tuesday, July 25, 2017

É possivel um RBI que não tenha grandes custos e que não desincentivo o trabalho?

The 2 most popular critiques of basic income are both wrong, por Dylan Matthews:

Making the case for universal basic income (UBI) has always required advocates to address two criticisms of the idea:
1. Giving people cash will cause them to work less, hurt the economy, and deprive them of the meaning that work provides in life.

2. Providing an income floor set at a reasonable level for everyone is unaffordable.

Call these the work critique and the cost critique. (...)

Let’s take the work critique first. University of Chicago economist Ioana Marinescu recently conducted a wide-ranging review of the literature on unconditional cash programs for the Roosevelt Institute, focusing on programs in the US and Canada. She examined experiments in the 1970s and ’80s that evaluated “negative income taxes” (NITs, essentially basic incomes that phase out as you earn more), Alaska’s Permanent Fund (which taxes oil extraction and returns the money directly to every man, woman, and child through an annual check), and a dividend the Eastern Band of Cherokees issued to members of the tribe from casino revenues.

All of these cases find reductions in work that are, at most, modest. (...)

The cost critique is even simpler than the work critique. (...)

In an absolute must-read paper for anyone interested in the basic income debate, the University of Michigan’s Jessica Wiederspan, Elizabeth Rhodes, and Luke Shaefer estimate the cost of the US adopting a negative income tax large enough to wipe out poverty. To be conservative and get a high-end cost estimate, they assume that such a program would discourage work substantially.

Despite that, they find that a household-based negative income tax, set at the US poverty line and with a 50 percent phaseout rate, would cost $219 billion a year. That’s almost the same as the combined cost of the earned income tax credit (which supports the working poor), Supplemental Security Income (itself basically a negative income tax but only for the elderly and disabled), food stamps, cash welfare, school meal programs, and housing subsidies. You could swap those programs out, put a guaranteed income in their place, and wipe out poverty entirely.
Não confio muito que ambas as críticas estejam erradas.

Para começar, no que diz respeito ao trabalho, é necessário distinguir entre o efeito-rendimento e o efeito-substituição; receber subsídios tende a fazer as pessoas trabalhar menos por dois mecanismo diferentes:

- O efeito-rendimento consiste em simplesmente o beneficiário passar a ter mais dinheiro, logo tem menos necessidade de trabalhar

- O efeito-substituição consiste no mecanismo do tipo "se eu arranjar um emprego a ganhar 600 euros perco o subsidio de 400, logo no fundo vou ganhar só 200; e por 200 euros não vale a pena".

Supostamente a grande vantagem do RBI sobre sistemas estilo Rendimento Social de Inserção é que a redução do trabalho só acontece via efeito-rendimento, já que como o subsidio não é cortado quando o rendimento aumenta, não acontece o efeito-substituição (ou só acontece na medida em que tem que pagar mais impostos, não por via do subsídio). Assim, o RBI terá muito menos o efeito de levar as pessoas a não trabalhar, em comparação.

Mas, se para a despesa ser comportável, e vai cortar o RBI à medida que o rendimento vai aumentando (como no modelo sugerido por Wiederspan, Rhodes e Shaefer, em que para cada 100 dólares de rendimento adicional que o beneficiário receba, o RBI é cortado em 50 dólares, a que imagino se junte ainda os impostos pagos direta ou indiretamente sobre o rendimento), então o RBI (se é que ainda lhe podemos chamar "RBI" neste caso) também vai reduzir o trabalho via efeito-substituição.

Ou seja, não podemos simultaneamente usar o exemplo do Alasca ou dos cherokees (em que há um rendimento distribuído mesmo igualitariamente por toda a gente) para dizer que o RBI não reduz a oferta de trabalho, e depois usar a proposta de Wiederspan, Rhodes e Shaefer (com um pseudo-RBI que se diminui à medida que o rendimento aumenta) para dizer que um RBI não vai sair muito caro.





https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/7/20/15821560/basic-income-critiques-cost-work-negative-income-tax

Tuesday, July 18, 2017

Rendimento Básico Incondicional - os limites de uma ideia

A basic income really could end poverty forever - But to become a reality, it needs to get detailed and stop being oversold, por Dylan Matthews (Vox):

Basic income advocates like to talk in effusive terms about the idea’s cross-partisan appeal, how it unites radical Marxists like André Gorz and libertarians like Milton Friedman and American heroes like Thomas Paine and Martin Luther King Jr. They speak of its radical potential to remake society, and position it as an inevitable and necessary response to an incoming torrent of technological change. (...)

You can’t assume away politics, though. And when you take a look under the hood of major plans from basic income advocates, the politics begin to look daunting. The coalition between left and right evaporates, the idea’s economic inevitability looks fanciful, and the promise that the plan could end poverty forever looks more dependent on technical details than you might think. (...)

We have gone through large automation shocks before; are self-driving trucks really a bigger step than, well, trucks were? And if trucks and washing machines and all the other labor-saving inventions of the 20th century didn’t put anyone permanently out of work, but instead shifted the kind of work that was being done, why would we think matters would be any different in the 21st century? Why could the laundry workers of the 1940s find new jobs but the truck drivers of the 2020s can’t?

Indeed, as my colleague Matthew Yglesias is fond of pointing out, technological productivity growth is actually well below historical averages. These are days of miracle and wonder, but our grandparents seem to have lived through even more miraculous times and did not see work disappear in the process.


Tuesday, July 11, 2017

Exercícios para desenvolver o cérebro versus jogos de computador

O Público dá destaque a uma notícia de título "Sabe aqueles exercícios que desenvolvem o cérebro? Talvez não o desenvolvam assim tanto", dizendo que  "os exercícios cognitivos vendidos por empresas para melhorar as capacidades neurológicas não trazem mais benefícios do que um simples videojogo".

No entanto, indo ver o estudo propriamente dito (de qualquer maneira, é um ponto a favor do Público terem posto um link para o estudo na notícia - grande parte das publicações on-line portuguesas não fazem isso quando falam de "estudos", e é uma trabalheira para encontrar o estudo e confirmar se tem alguma coisa a ver com o que é noticiado) parece-me um pouco mais complexo.

Em primeiro lugar, parece-me que o que está a ser testado é mais o efeito desses "exercicios" sobre coisas ligados à capacidade de autocontrole do que propriamente à capacidade intelectual em sentido estrito:

Increased preference for immediate over delayed and for risky over certain rewards has been associated with unhealthy behavioral choices. Motivated by evidence that enhanced cognitive control can shift choice behavior away from immediate and risky rewards, we tested whether training executive cognitive function could influence choice behavior and brain responses. (...) Pre- and post-training, participants completed cognitive assessments and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during performance of validated decision-making tasks: delay discounting (choices between smaller rewards now vs. larger rewards in the future) and risk sensitivity (choices between larger riskier rewards vs. smaller certain rewards).
Ou seja, o que está a ser testado é se os participantes, após os treinos, "aprendem" a preferir o longo-prazo ao curto-prazo e o seguro ao arriscado.

Eu posso estar completamente enganado, mas tenho a ideia que as pessoas que fazem/compram esses exercícios tem com motivação primeira desenvolver e treinar o raciocinio, conseguirem pensar mais depressa, etc., não tento aumentar a sua autodisciplina e auto controle (ainda mais que creio que esses exercicios são frequentemente direcionados para a população mais idosa, cujas preocupações sejam mais "não quer ficar senil e com o raciocínio atrofiado" e não tanto "não quero ser um esgroviado que não pensa no futuro e gasta tudo em copos, mulheres [alterar de acordo com sexo e preferência] e motos de alta cilindrada").

Ordoliberalismo e neoliberalismo

A respeito desta discussão entre Vital Moreira e João Rodrigues sobre se o "ordoliberalismo" é uma variante do "neoliberalismo", suspeito que o problema talvez esteja na história da palavra "neoliberalismo", que dá-me a ideia ter 3 sentidos distintos:

a) Nas décadas a seguir à II Guerra Mundial, era praticamente a mesma coisa que "ordoliberalismo", tendo o "neo-" o sentido de ser um "novo liberalismo", modernizado e sem os radicalismos do liberalismo clássico tradicional; p.ex., o texto de 1951 de Milton Friedman, "Neo-Liberalism and Its Prospects" [pdf] define "neoliberalismo" de uma forma praticamente idêntica a "ordoliberalismo"

b) A partir dos anos 80, "neoliberalismo" começou a ser usado pela esquerda para designar o movimento de privatização e desregulamentação da economia e redução dos impostos posto em prática por governantes como Reagan e Thatcher, e tendo como ideólogos Hayek e os economistas da Escola de Chicago, como Milton Friedman; neste sentido, o "neo-" tem um significado puramente cronológico, de ser, em termos temporais, uma nova vaga de liberalismo, depois do liberalismo do século XIX e do pré-I Guerra Mundial. Pode-se argumentar que Friedman mostra que os dois estão ligados, já que este escreveu o tal texto de 1951 sobre o "neoliberalismo" no sentido de ordoliberalismo, mas parece-me que não se pode fazer esse salto; em primeiro lugar, nem é certo que o Friedman dos anos 70/80/90/00 pensasse o mesmo que o de 1951; e, de qualquer maneira, não é por, pelos vistos, aceitar a politica anti-trust que Friedman é frequentemente chamado de "neoliberal" - é por todas as suas outras posições anti-intervenção e anti-regulação, e seria à mesma (ou se calhar ainda mais) chamado de "neoliberal" se fosse contra as leis anti-trust

c) Em certa altura, a partir dos anos 90, e com as políticas de Clinton, começou também a chamar-se, nos EUA, "neoliberais" aos "liberais" (no sentido norte-americano, isto é, social-democratas) mais adeptos de alguma desregulamentação (e talvez sobretudo dos acordos internacionais de comércio livre) - é praticamente a mesma coisa que na Europa se chamou "terceira via" (é neste sentido que, p.ex., um Brad DeLong se define por vezes como um "neoliberal"). Agora aqui, tal como no primeiro caso, o "neo-" tem a conotação de ser um "novo liberalismo", modernizado e sem os radicalismos do liberalismo tradicional - só que neste caso, o liberalismo tradicional é o "liberalismo" norte-americano dos anos 60/70. Diga-se que por vezes este sentido também se mistura com o anterior; p.ex., quando nas presidenciais de 2016 (nomedamente nas primárias Democratas) se dizia que Hillary Clinton representava as políticas neoliberais, dá-me a ideia que umas pessoas estavam a usar "neoliberal" neste sentido e outras no anterior

Por norma, o primeiro e o terceiro sentido são autoproclamados; já o segundo sentido praticamente só é utilizado pelos seus críticos.

Monday, July 10, 2017

Populismos

Há anos escrevi que "populista" quer dizer ou "politico de direita europeu de que não gosto" ou "politico de esquerda sul-americano de que não gosto".

Lembrei-me disto lendo este texto de Dani Rodrik (via Tyler Cowen):

The populist backlash may have been predictable, but the specific form it took was less so. Populism comes in different versions. It is useful to distinguish between left-wing and right-wing variants of populism, which differ with respect to the societal cleavages that populist politicians highlight and render salient. The US progressive movement and most Latin American populism took a left-wing form. Donald Trump and European populism today represent, with some instructive exceptions, the right-wing variant (Figure 2). What accounts for the emergence of right-wing versus left-wing variants of opposition to globalization?

Thursday, July 06, 2017

O Estado deve pagar o ensino superior? E a quem?

O economista inglês Andrew Lilico sugere que apenas os melhores alunos deveriam receber bolsas de estudo e os restantes deveriam pagar o custo da formação universitária.

Under this system, poor but gifted students would receive full funding and maintenance. There would be no means testing. Outside the top 10-12 per cent of students, all that the state would really be doing would be addressing liquidity issues. There would be state support only for the top 35 per cent of students.

We can afford to fund higher education to a much greater extent, but only if we do so by focusing that funding on a much smaller group of students — the most gifted being the most appropriate group to focus upon.

That does not mean that only 35 per cent of students would attend. Others would doubtless attend, funding themselves from parental resources, private sector loans or extra jobs.
Já agora, uma vista de olhos pelos motivos pelo qual ele considera que o Estado financia a educação (nomeadamente a superior):
There are three proper reasons:

1 The Externality Argument – Higher education delivers benefits to society as a whole in addition to those benefits experienced by the student herself. That means a pure market is likely to under-provide higher education (fewer people will go than is best for society).

2 The Liquidity Argument – People will gain the most from higher education if they attend when relatively young, when their minds are most flexible and they have longer post-education to reap its rewards. But early in life people will not have been able to establish a track record with banks and other lenders, and so may find it difficult to obtain loans against their future human capital improvements.

3 The Glory Argument – Once we had kings, dukes, and other Great Men of the past who acted as benefactors and promoters of art and research and other goods provided through universities. Modern governments tend to tax away much of the surplus wealth that Great Men used in this way (for other socially important programmes such as health and income support). That means there would be a loss from reduced philanthropy if the government did not at least replace the philanthropy of these Great Men.

Higher education obviously provides other important social functions, but these are not good reasons for government intervention in it. For example, one of the main purposes of higher education is as a “consumption good” — the university life, with its freedom of thought, bonding experiences and general fun is a great thing to be part of. But things we enjoy doing and benefit from are usually best paid for by us, not the government.

Similarly, much is made of the benefits of education in preparing students for working life in a modern economy — that it is an investment with a high personal return. In which case, people will be more than willing to invest and government intervention will not be needed.
As duas primeiras razões (externalidade e liquidez) parecem-me muito os que apresento aqui ("externalidade") e aqui ("liquidez"); mas Lilico é muito mais otimista face ao mercado poder resolver o fator "liquidez" - "I suspect people would find it fairly easy to borrow privately to fund education if the state did not lend to them and if financial markets were healthy (the latter possibly still not being so, post-2007)." - do que eu - "um empréstimo à educação que verdadeiramente não criasse "constrangimentos de tesouraria" ao beneficiários seria um que durante o curso pagasse, não só livros e propinas, mas também o equivalente ao ordenado que o beneficiários receberia se estivesse a trabalhar em vez de a estudar (ou talvez um valor um pouco abaixo, assumindo que estudar é mais divertido que trabalhar) e que, depois, pudesse ser amortizado em suaves prestações durante 20 ou 30 anos - ou seja, um empréstimo que cobrisse todo o custo da educação, e tivesse um prazo de amortização comparável ao período em que a educação gera rendimentos (que é basicamente o tempo de vida activa do individuo). Posso estar enganado, mas penso que não são frequentes os empréstimos com essas condições."

Mas a ideia que este artigo me despertou foi outra - até que ponto a proposta de Lilico, de que o Estado só deveria pagar a universidade dos melhores alunos (independentemente do seu rendimento), não era, na prática, o que vigorava em Portugal até 1993 (quando as propinas nas universidades públicas era simbólicas)? Isto é, os melhores alunos iam para a universidade pública (gratuita), e os outros, se quisessem tirar um curso universitário, iam para a privada, a pagar (OK, a Universidade Católica - privada, paga e para os bons alunos - sai um bocado deste esquema, mas tirando isso era a regra geral).

Tuesday, July 04, 2017

Conservadores, progressistas e "produtos alternativos"

All the “wellness” products Americans love to buy are sold on both Infowars and Goop, por Nikhil Sonnad (Quartz):

There are two Americas, we’ve been told.

There’s Duck Dynasty America and Modern Family America. There’s“gosh” America and “dope” America. Sometimes, though, Americans unite around a common idea. Like the healing powers of eleuthero root, cordyceps mushrooms, and “nascent iodine.”

Near the end of a profile of Amanda Chantal Bacon, founder of the “wellness” brand Moon Juice, the New York Times Magazine noted that many of the alternative-medicine ingredients in her products are sold—with very different branding—on the Infowars store. That’s the site run by Alex Jones, the radio show host and conspiracy theorist who has saidthat both the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School and the Boston Marathon bombing were staged. Moon Juice is frequently recommended by Gwyneth Paltrow’s wellness blog, Goop; it’s a favorite of Hollywood celebrities and others who can afford things like $25 “activated cashews.” Infowars, on the other hand, is a dark corner of the American right, heavy on guns, light on government intervention, and still very mad at Obama.

We at Quartz have created a compendium, from Ashwagandha to zizyphus, of the magical healing ingredients both sides of the political spectrum are buying, and how they are presented to each. We looked at the ingredients used in products sold on the Infowars store, and compared them to products on the wellness shops Moon Juice andGoop. All make similar claims about the health benefits of these ingredients, but what gets called “Super Male Vitality” by Infowars is branded as “Sex Dust” by Moon Juice.
Não me admirava que noutros assuntos (p.ex., vacinas) também haja alguma sobreposição entre a "esquerda Hollywood" e a "direita Infowars".

Thursday, June 29, 2017

Integrar os terrenos "não-cuidados" nas matas nacionais?

Ultimamente têm surgido propostas para nacionalizar, integrar nas matas nacionais, etc, os terrenos florestais considerados ao abandono.

Algo que receio nisso é que a integração nas matas nacionais pode ser o primeiro passo para um governo seguinte as privatizar, produzindo como resultado final a transferência dos pequenos proprietários para os grandes (1ª fase, com a esquerda no governo: pequenos proprietários → matas nacionais; 2ª fase, com a direita no governo: matas nacionais → grandes proprietários).

[Post publicado no Vias de Facto; podem comentar lá]

Tuesday, June 06, 2017

Prisão perpétua para manifestantes anti-Trump?

Anti-Trump protester: 'Is this my last free birthday?' (Al-Jazeera)

More than 200 anti-Trump protesters are facing felony charges that could land some in prison for 70 to 80 years. (...)

On January 21, most of the 230 protesters and bystanders arrested the day before were charged with felony rioting, which carries a maximum prison sentence of 10 years and a $25,000 fine.

But on April 27, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia returned a superseding indictment which added additional charges for some 212 defendants, three of whom had not previously been charged.

With new felony charges including urging to riot, conspiracy to riot and destruction of property, many of the defendants are facing up to 80 years in prison. Many other defendants, among them journalists, are facing more than 70 years.

A handful of defendants have made deals with the authorities and entered guilty pleas in exchange for significantly shorter sentences.

But more than 130 of them have joined a 'Points of Unity' agreement, a collective pledge to reject any potential plea deals and reject cooperation with the prosecutors that comes at the expense of their co-defendants.