Monday, February 28, 2011

Intervenção internacional na Líbia?

On International Intervention and the Dire Situation in Libya, por Asli Bali and Ziad Abu-Rish, no site Jadaliyya (via twitter Libyans Revolt):

If al-Qaddafi’s regime falls today or tomorrow, debates about intervention will be moot. But unfolding events present an interesting opportunity to engage with interventionist arguments. The very fact that calls for intervention come at the eleventh hour and rarely emerge in time to make a meaningful impact or stave off the worst of atrocities in situations of crisis is itself worth noticing. Beyond that, we offer some reflections on the merits of different interventionist scenarios in the Libyan context specifically.


The first test of any would-be interventionist is this: do no harm. And there is very little evidence that direct intervention in the Libyan case could meet this test. For instance, calls for a no-fly zone by Libya’s Deputy Ambassador to the U.N. (drawing on the Iraqi precedent of the 1990s) and an air campaign by others (drawing on the Kosovo precedent from 1999) would surely fail this test. Neither option would shield the Libyan civilian population from the regime’s coercive apparatus (which is not principally aerial) and both options may entail serious costs to civilians by freezing or exacerbating the situation on the ground. Beyond raising questions of enforcement (would international forces fire on Libyan aircraft?), a no-fly zone might well block one method of escape for Libyan civilians or close an avenue for defections by members of the air force, such as the four pilots that are known to have flown out and defected in disobedience of direct orders to bomb civilians. Alternatively, air strikes run the risk of serious damage to both the civilian population and infrastructure. In short, any intervention must be crafted to offer real support to the civilian population of Libya, which direct forms of coercive intervention like no-fly zones or air strikes would not. But are there other forms of intervention that would be better suited to the task? Given limited knowledge of Libya’s internal dynamics at present and the heavy-handed interventionist toolkit developed to date by the international community any such option must be approached with caution.

Coercive options should be taken off the table. Absent the political will to commit ground forces to serve as a meaningful buffer between the regime and the population, any coercive intervention will do more damage (particularly to civilians) than good. Further, even if the political will existed for forceful intervention to offer direct protection to Libyan civilians, history suggests that the ultimate outcome of such intervention would still be harmful. Aside from the obvious potential threats to the civilian populations from the presence of foreign troops on their soil, including risks from a ground conflict and risks associated with the possibility of a prolonged presence, there are additional considerations that weigh against such intervention. At a time when the regime appears to be crumbling from within, as a result of the courageous mobilization of its own people, to engage in an eleventh hour intervention runs the very serious risk of depriving the Libyan people of their control over the hard-won transition they have initiated. To rebrand the Libyan uprising with the last minute trappings of international liberation (read: “Made in the West”) would do a serious disservice to the achievements of the protesters. Of course, none of this is to absolve the international community of its obligation to support Libyan civilians. Rather, we seek to identify a principled course of action that speaks to the dire situation, our responsibilities towards it, and the power relations that frame it.

In the immediate context, the most appropriate role for the international community is in providing humanitarian assistance and desisting from any further support to the regime. In addition to condemning the regime’s resort to violence, there are at least five modalities for the provision of such assistance, all of which should be employed immediately, with the support of the Security Council. First, all borders should be opened and appropriate facilities created to allow Libyan civilians to flee regime violence. If various governments are going to create exit routes through charter flights and land crossings for their own citizens, they also need to create a mechanism for Libyans to get out. Second, all available means for providing direct humanitarian assistance on the ground to the Libyan population should be utilized, including aid convoys to eastern Libya through Egypt and to western Libya through Tunisia. Third, al-Qaddafi’s assets and those of remaining elements of the regime should be frozen and kept in safe keeping to be given to whatever post-Qaddafi system emerges. Fourth, governments with ties to Libya should immediately sever all military ties, withholding delivery of materiel and cancelling all outstanding contracts. Finally, an arms embargo should be imposed preventing the sale or delivery of military equipment or personnel (including foreign mercenaries) to the Libyan state security forces. Sanctions that target military materiel, services and the movement of reinforcements from among foreign mercenaries are essential. Sanctions that go beyond these aims would run the risk of causing more harm to civilians than to the regime.

Beyond these measures, several other recent suggestions for intervention – ranging from direct coercion to demands for immediate international criminal accountability – raise a number of troubling implications that should give pause to those acting in solidarity with the Libyan people. (...) For instance, in a post-transition Libya, individuals with ties to the West or experience with energy markets might emerge as favored interlocutors, identified with international approval as “moderate” and “appropriate.” To invite forceful international intervention in the last days of the current regime might empower external interveners to make such choices, potentially at the expense of the preferences of the Libyan people. Particularly in light of how little is known about the current political dynamics among opposition groups within Libya, international intervention may entail a particularly high risk that the narrative framing of events will be captured by external actors in ways that are adverse to local Libyan choices.

Even more troubling, however, are the implications for regime risk calculations associated with the differential international position of the Libyan state as compared to Tunisia and Egypt. As we have seen, despite clear evidence that the regime has lost its grip on power as a result of the scale of the popular mobilization and defections, al-Qaddafi appears to be upping the ante rhetorically and in practice with escalations of violence. The likelihood that he will continue to raise the stakes is a real one that turns on two factors. The first is al-Qaddafi’s continued control of at least a proportion of his security forces, including parts of the military. The second is the absence of alternatives to a desperate bid to retain power through force. There is little that international actors can do to influence the first factor other than make clear that anyone who commits acts of violence against civilians, whether or not under orders, will be investigated and held liable under standards of international accountability. International measures designed to influence those within the chain of command of the military or security forces to switch sides and support the demonstrators are certainly legitimate. In practice, however, internal dynamics are far likelier to impact these immediate calculations than threats of future prosecution. There is, however, a chance to influence the second factor more decisively.

(...) Outside of Sudan, few leaders in the region are likely to have as keen an appreciation of the prospects of imprisonment, prosecution, and sentencing by an international court as al-Qaddafi. In fact, this scenario is quite plausible should al-Qaddafi physically survive the end of his regime, since he would offer the international community an excellent opportunity to symbolically stand with protesters across the region at low cost. Whereas meaningful accountability for deposed former Western allies might prove embarrassing, the prosecution of al-Qaddafi would vindicate calls for international justice without similar risks. Unlike the final indignity of a forced but comfortable resignation in Egypt and Tunisia, al-Qaddafi might well appreciate that his final days will more closely resemble those of the deposed Iraqi dictator made to stand trial. The prospect of retirement in a prison cell in the Hague may factor into al-Qaddafi’s incentives to make good on his threats to fight to the last of his capacities, visiting untold atrocities on Libyan civilians in the process. Paradoxically, then, providing al-Qaddafi with an immediate exit strategy to a safe haven might be the right choice from a humanitarian perspective. Shifting the regime’s incentives by offering an option that is neither death nor prosecution may well be the most humanitarian of presently available options for international intervention. Working with Venezuela, neighboring countries or others that would be willing to provide safe passage to Qaddafi would be far preferable than the apocalyptic endgame that the regime might otherwise pursue for lack of alternatives. The missed opportunity to pursue immediate prosecution pales in comparison to the death and destruction that might be avoided by shifting the regime’s risk calculation in this way. Moreover, little is lost by pursuing an immediate exit strategy today while leaving open the possibility of international criminal accountability down the line. In truth, international prosecutions take significant time and resources and do not represent an immediate alternative regardless. Threatening al-Qaddafi with war crimes prosecutions today may create perverse incentives with little strategic benefit. Securing him an exit option now may have the strategic benefit of sparing the Libyan people the violent death throes of their doomed regime.

We thus return to our original do-no-harm principle. We neither advocate abandoning the Libyan people to the violence of the regime nor protecting al-Qaddafi from accountability. But as calls for international intervention grow, we must worry about the risk of counter-productive results for Libyans on the ground of some of the options being considered. A combined strategy of humanitarian assistance, severing existing military ties with the regime, and generating exit options for al-Qaddafi and his family may well be the best course for accomplishing the goal of supporting Libya’s civilian population.

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