Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia [PDF], por Benjamin A. Olken, na American Political Science Review,Vol. 104, No. 2, (Maio de 2010):
This article presents an experiment in which 49 Indonesian villages were randomly assigned to choose development projects through either representative-based meetings or direct election-based plebiscites. Plebiscites resulted in dramatically higher satisfaction among villagers, increased knowledge about the project, greater perceived benefits, and higher reported willingness to contribute. Changing the political mechanism had much smaller effects on the actual projects selected, with some evidence that plebiscites resulted in projects chosen by women being located in poorer areas. The results suggest that direct participation in political decision making can substantially increase satisfaction and legitimacy.Direct Democracy and Land Use Policy: Exchanging Public Goods for Development Rights [PDF], por Elisabeth R. Gerber and Justin H. Phillips, em Urban Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2, (Fev., 2004):
This study analyses the effects of one type of direct democracy—voter requirements for new development—on municipal growth. Analysing data from a sample of California communities, we consider the impact of voter requirements on the land use process and outcomes. We find that—in general—voter requirements fail to stop new development; property owners and developers can and do adapt to the constraints created by these direct democracy institutions. We also find, however, that voter requirements change the land use process in important ways. Specifically, they change the way developers interact with interest groups in the community and force developers to compensate current residents for enduring some of the negative aspects of growth.Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiative [link de acesso restrito], por Elisabeth Gerber, no American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Fev., 1996):
A spatial model of the policy process is used to identify conditions under which the threat of initiatives constrains legislative behavior. Legislators in states that allow initiatives are expected to pass laws that more closely reflect their state's median voter's preference than legislators in states that do not allow initiatives.Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old Questions [link de acesso restrito], por Arthur Lupia and John G. Matsusaka, na Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 7 (Junho de 2004):
We organize the discussion around four “old” questions that have long been at the heart of the direct democracy debate: Are voters competent? What role does money play? How does direct democracy affect policy? Does direct democracy benefit the many or the few? We find that recent breakthroughs in theory and empirical analysis paint a comparatively positive picture of the initiative and referendum. For example, voters are more competent, and the relationship between money and power in direct democracy is less nefarious, than many observers allege. More new studies show that the mere presence of direct democracy induces sitting legislatures to govern more effectively.[Via Shom Mazumder]
1 comment:
O mecanismo é fácil de entender: https://youtu.be/rStL7niR7gs
O livro referenciado nesse vídeo aborda vários exemplos concretos e está associado a uma pesquisa que mostra empiricamente isso mesmo: quando mais se acentua o carácter democrático do regime, mais melhoram as suas políticas públicas.
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