Trump pode sabotar as eleições?

Eu duvido muito desses cenários de autogolpe, mas deixo aqui um artigo sobre o assunto:

The Election That Could Break America, por Barton Gellman (The Atlantic):

If the vote is close, Donald Trump could easily throw the election into chaos and subvert the result. Who will stop him? (...)

The worst case, however, is not that Trump rejects the election outcome. The worst case is that he uses his power to prevent a decisive outcome against him. If Trump sheds all restraint, and if his Republican allies play the parts he assigns them, he could obstruct the emergence of a legally unambiguous victory for Biden in the Electoral College and then in Congress. He could prevent the formation of consensus about whether there is any outcome at all. He could seize on that un­certainty to hold on to power.

Trump’s state and national legal teams are already laying the groundwork for postelection maneuvers that would circumvent the results of the vote count in battleground states. Ambiguities in the Constitution and logic bombs in the Electoral Count Act make it possible to extend the dispute all the way to Inauguration Day, which would bring the nation to a precipice. The Twentieth Amendment is crystal clear that the president’s term in office “shall end” at noon on January 20, but two men could show up to be sworn in. One of them would arrive with all the tools and power of the presidency already in hand.

Isto parece-me um cenário parecido com o que o João Vasco previa aqui.

A "cancel culture" como dupla vitória da esquerda "progressista"

Este post de Bryan Caplan faz-me pensar numa coisa: a chamada "cancel culture" pode ser vista como uma dupla vitória da esquerda (nomeadamente a esquerda feminista, anti-racista, etc.).

Em primeiro lugar, pela razão óbvia - a acreditar no que se diz, é sobretudo este esquerda que está "cancelando" e a direita a ser "cancelada".

Mas também por uma razão mais profunda - se efetivamente existir uma tendência para pessoas serem discriminadas na vida profissional por causa das suas opiniões políticas, isso desmente a teoria de que no mercado não há discriminação e que portanto diferenças de rendimento entre homens e mulheres, ou entre negros e brancos só podem ser explicadas por diferenças de produtividade ou opções pessoais dos individuos supostamente discriminados. Afinal, se se considera que os conservadores estão a ser sistematicamente discriminados por causa de um ambiente social e cultural que leva as empresas a fazer essa discriminação, então temos forçosamente que concluir que também pode existir (ou tenha existido) um ambiente social e cultural que leve (ou tenha levado) as empresas a discriminar contra mulheres ou negros.

Agora, o reverso - junto com estas duas vitórias da esquerda "nova", há também uma derrota da esquerda "tradicional": é que com isto estão se a tornar populares na esquerda argumentos como "ninguém tem direito a um emprego" ou "uma rede social privada deixa falar quem quer e expulsa quem quer".

Os EUA à beira de uma insurreição? (III)

Storm coming, por John Cochrane:

Imagine, as seems quite possible, that  Trump scores an early lead in the days after the election, with a narrow electoral college majority, though losing the popular vote, with 90% - 10% losses in the deep blue cities. Trump declares victory. Blue cities erupt in  protest.

As mail in votes come in and are tabulated, Biden gets closer and closer and by his party's count has won.

 But lawyers have already fanned out around the country. Every single smudged postmark, questionable signature is challenged by both sides. Conspiracy theories abound. Vote harvesting stories are told. A few bales of forgotten mail are discovered. As the key battleground counties are isolated, we have 50  hanging chad controversies, with warring and disagreeing injections by different courts.  More protests erupt on  both sides. (...)

No, this makes it a virtual certainty that courts will weigh in.(...)

We will have the 2000 hanging chads all over again -- except in multiple states and counties all at the same time.

All that ends up in the Supreme Court, on a tight deadline. (There are abundant legal issues, which are beside the point. The suits will be filed, argued heatedly, and people will be in the streets protesting.)

This was going to be bad enough. Now suppose that the Senate has flipped to Democrats, 51-49, but the lame duck Senate confirms a Trump appointee to the court. Protests and riots erupt. (There are already protests, here for example, and Trump hasn't even nominated anyone. Another, from "grandma, team resistance:"   "If he tries to appoint someone, it's civil war, and I'll be on the front line." There are demonstrators in front of Senator Mitch McConnell's house now.  I just googled "Ginsburg protest," there's lots more.)

And then suppose that  court decides, 5-4, or even 6-3 with the new member, in favor of Trump. In the softer gentler era of 2000, many democrats never acknowledged that Bush legitimately won the election. (I read the New Yorker which called it  "stolen" for years afterwards. I have never seen them acknowledge that in the final count, Bush did, actually, win.) Democratic acknowledgement that Trump really did win in 2016 and is the legitimate President of the United States has been soft at best.  Can you imagine they would sit still for the legitimacy of this outcome?
There will be widespread protest, violence and looting. Right and leftwing "militias" will face off. We are not fighting about abstractions like "social justice." This a good old fashioned fight about political power.

What do you do if you are president with cities burning? You send in the troops. Republicans will call it "law and order, " "protecting life, property and the rule of law." Democrats will decry this as "martial law," and a "coup." And with some justification:  To their view, protesting such a presidential outcome is the same as protests all over the world, in Hong Kong, in Iran, in Belarus, that aim to topple illegitimate regimes, though those regimes are "lawful" by their laws and procedures for implementing those laws.

Isto é uma mistura de b) e c) no meu cenário.

Cochrane (um economista conservador de Chicago) apresenta mais uns quantos cenários possíveis ("Risk analysis 101: If there is one path to disaster, by which 5 improbable events have to fail, you're probably ok. But if many scenarios all come back to the same disaster, the chance of that disaster is larger").

Zona Autónoma Temporária?

DOJ Designates New York City as an “Anarchist Jurisdiction” (NBC New York)

Quantos juizes do Supremo Tribunal dos EUA foram confirmados a menos de dois meses de uma eleição presidencial?

De acordo com esta lista, parece-me que nenhum.

Poderá-se perguntar se não é uma simples questão de probabilidade estatística, mas haveria 1/24 de probabilidade de isso acontecer (o Supremo Tribunal já teve 114 juizes, mesmo se descontarmos os 10 nomeados por George Washington, já poderiam ter havido uns 4 ou 5).

E já depois das eleições, mas ainda antes do novo presidente tomar posse?

William Burnham Woods, confirmado em dezembro de 1880, nomeado pelo Republicano Rutherford Hayes, já depois do Republicano James Garfield ter sido eleito

Howell Edmunds Jackson, confirmado, por unanimidade, em fevereiro de 1893, nomeado pelo Republicano James Garfield, já depois do Democrata Cleveland ter sido eleito (Howell Jackson era Democrata)

Samuel Nelson, confirmado, por unanimidade, em fevereiro de 1845, nomeado por John Tyler (eleito como um Whig, mas entretanto expulso do partido), já depois do Democrata James Polk ter sido eleito (Samuel Nelson era Democrata)

Peter Vivian Delan, confirmado em março de 1841, nomeado pelo Democrata Martin Van Buren, já depois do Whig William Harrison ter sido eleito (Peter Delan era Democrata); esta parece que foi mesmo muito polémica, mas como os Democratas tinham a maioria no Senado, a oposição dos Whigs de nada serviu

John Catron, confirmado em março de 1837, nomeado pelo Democrata Andrew Jackson, já depos do Democrata Martin Van Buren ter sido eleito

John Marshal, confirmado, por unanimidade, em janeiro de 1801, nomeado pelo Federalista John Adams, já depois do "Republicano" (isto é, Democrata) Thomas Jefferson ter sido eleito (Marshal era Federalista)

Como o poder da Apple reforça o poder dos governos

A fight over freedom at Apple’s core, por Jonathan Zittrain, no Financial Times (é um artigo de 2010, mas se calhar é atual):

Thirty years later Apple gave us the iPhone . It was easy to use, elegant and cool – and had lots of applications right out of the box. But the company quietly dropped a fundamental feature, one signalled by the dropping of “Computer” from Apple Computer’s name: the iPhone could not be programmed by outsiders. “We define everything that is on the phone,” said Mr Jobs. “You don’t want your phone to be like a PC. The last thing you want is to have loaded three apps on your phone and then you go to make a call and it doesn’t work any more.”

The openness on which Apple had built its original empire had been completely reversed – but the spirit was still there among users. Hackers vied to “jailbreak” the iPhone, running new apps on it despite Apple’s desire to keep it closed. Apple threatened to disable any phone that had been jailbroken, but then appeared to relent: a year after the iPhone’s introduction, it launched the App Store. Now outsiders could write software for the iPhone (...)

But the App Store has a catch: app developers and their software must be approved by Apple. If Apple does not like the app, for any reason, it is gone. (...)

If Apple is the gatekeeper to a device’s uses, the governments of the world need knock on the door of only one office in Cupertino, California – Apple’s headquarters – to demand changes to code or content.

Nassim Taleb sobre "acordos de paz"

Just a reminder (frm #SkinInTheGame) that
1) Peace with the top is not peace.
2) The best peace is one that is struck w/ the most radical enemies, not "moderates", or, worse, Gulf states that were never at war with Israel. Learn from Ireland & the IRA.https://t.co/jmQRStQC88

— Nassim Nicholas Taleb (@nntaleb) September 15, 2020

Manifestantes violentos nos EUA condenados a 20 anos de prisão?

Attorney General Bill Barr Encourages Federal Prosecutors To Charge Violent Protesters With Sedition, por Christian Britschgi (Reason):

Barr, according to a story published today by The Wall Street Journal, encouraged prosecutors on a conference call last week to charge violent protestors with federal offenses wherever possible. The attorney general encouraged the use of sedition charges even in contexts when state charges would apply, reports the Journal, which spoke to several people familiar with the call.

Federal sedition law makes it a crime for two or more people to "conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force" the U.S. government, and it comes with a potential penalty of 20 years in prison.

The invocation of rarely used sedition laws to go after protestors is raising alarm among civil libertarians and some legal experts.

Vaga de esterilizações nos campos de detenção do "SEF" dos EUA?

Provavelmente não - parece tratar-se de um médico que está a defraudar o ICE executando (?) procedimentos desnecessários e depois cobrando ao ICE.

Now that Amin's name is public: this is about a doctor with a history of medical fraud allegations, gaming a system that wasn't designed to protect im/migrant women. He's an immigrant himself; I've seen no evidence that he's a white supremacist.

— Aura Bogado (@aurabogado) September 15, 2020

If Amin wanted to sterilize women, he could have used cheap IUDs. Hysterectomies are very expensive, an easy way to rack up taxpayer money. "Concentration camps are sterlizing women" headlines are paternalistic and further erase victims. Victims no one talks *to*, only *about*.

— Aura Bogado (@aurabogado) September 15, 2020

"OK, Boomer"

Esta sequência de posts no twitter de Noah Smith, dizendo que afinal os maiores apoiantes de Trump não são os "boomers" (nascidos algures entre 46 e 64), mas sim a ala conservadora da "Geração X" (nascidos para aí entre 65 e 80), fez-me lembrar algo que há muito tempo estava a pensar escrever (este post estava nos rascunhos desde dezembro, ou seja, comecei a escrevê-lo ainda antes dos "boomers" entrarem na lista de espécies ameaçadas da WWF; depois deixei-o de molho exatamente porque o assunto tinha largamente sido abandonado).

É que desde para aí uns dois anos,  parecia ter havido uma inversão quase total dos estereótipos ideológicos tradicionalmente associados à geração "boomer".

Isto é, de há uns tempos para cá, surgiu a ideia que os "boomers" seriam uma geração particularmente conservadora (exemplo) - quando eu passei toda a minha juventude a ouvir falar que a "geração de 60" (a geração de Gloria Bunker e Michael Stivic, e também a de Steven e Elyse Keaton) era A GERAÇÃO PROGRESSISTA por excelência, não apenas mais progressista que as anteriores (o que é normal) mas até que as posteriores (era esse o ponto da série "Quem sai aos seus..." - o contraponto entre a progressista "geração de 60" e a conservadora "geração de 80")

Já agora, cá em Portugal eu passei a minha adolescência com as escolas secundárias dominadas pela JSD, e na primeira campanha eleitoral que dei nota, o liceu estava a abarrotar de autocolantes "P'rá Frente Portugal" - embora em Portugal houvesse a peculiaridade que a geração "progressista" não era tanto a dos nosso pais, mas sim  mas sim um misto de tios mais novos, primos afastados mais velhos e professores no principio de carreira (o pessoal na casa dos 30 anos, que tinha sido jovem nos nossos "anos 60" - 1974 e 1975; pelo menos uma prima afastada minha, então com 30 e tal anos, consta que ex-simpatante do PRP e típica "progressista nos costumes", era fã de uma série que havia na altura que era "Os Trintões" e dizia que representava bem a geração dela; essa série era por vezes descrita como o contraponto a "Quem sai aos seus...").

Sinais da mitificação da "geraçao de 60": ainda me lembro de há muitos anos (para aí em 1990) ter lido um artigo (penso que do João Martins Pereira, o já falecido ex-marido da Fátima Bonifácio... - ou será que mesmo isto é um exemplo da mudança do que se espera dum boomer?) que algures dizia "todos as pessoas entre os 30 e os 60 anos tendem a descrever-se como da geração de 60, grande abrigo anti-sismico mais seguro que as de 50 e de 70"; e alguém se lembra de por volta de 1973 ter surgido (com o impacto que teve) algum filme similar a "Os amigos de Alex", mas a evocar os anos 50? (o mais parecido seria o American Graffiti, mas muito longe - nem que seja porque o período que evoca é já o principio dos anos 60).

Isto talvez seja uma especificidade da chamada "Geração X", mas nós crescemos a ouvir associar a geração de 60 à geração dos contestatários e dos progressistas (sempre que havia um protesto de estudantes nos anos 80, alguém falava em "regresso aos anos 60?"), pelo que agora me dá alguma dissonância cognitiva a conversa do "OK Boomer"; por outro lado, també é verdade que "boomer" não é sinónimo de "geração de 60" - se adotarmos a definição de "nascido entre 1946 e 1964", isso incluirá também muitos dos então tão atacados yuppies dos anos 80 (mesmo o Alex P. Keaton era suposto, in-universe, ter nascido em 1965, logo só não seria um boomer por um ano).

Nota 1: suspeito que nestas coisa de conservadorsmo versus progressismo por gerações, há também 
uma grande mistura entre a função e a derivada, ou talvez até a segunda derivada...

Nota 2: tenho também uma ainda maior desconfiança face ao conceito de "geração X" (tenho também um post nos rascunhos sobre isso), que em Portugal abrangeria tanto a geração "Prá Frente Portugal" como a "geração rasca", largamente opostas; eu suspeito que há uma diferença marcada entre as pessoas da minha idade ou mais velhas (a típica geração de 80), e as mais novas que eu (a "geração rasca", e também a do grunge e, em Portugal, do rap).

[Post publicado no Vias de Facto; podem comentar lá]

"Cuties"/"Mignonnes" e o #CancelNetflix (II)

Cuties is Not What You Think, por Emina Melonic (Splice Today):

Maïmouna Doucouré’s directorial debut, Cuties (French: Mignonnes, 2020) has been consistently under attack since Netflix released it on September 9. Netflix’s promotional poster and trailer primarily includes a group of 11-year-old girls dancing in a sexually suggestive manner, and it’s caused an uproar. The rage has extended beyond mindless, uninformed noise. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR) have officially filed a letter to Attorney General William Barr to investigate Netflix for the distribution of child pornography. (...)

Setting aside the absurdity of this controversy, Doucouré’s film is an exploration of the difficulty young girls face growing up in today’s demanding society. The story centers on Amy, a Senegalese 11-year-old girl, who’s caught between two cultures: her fundamentalist Muslim upbringing and the disordered, libertine culture of France. This is already a problem for a young immigrant girl, but the added issue of the Internet culture that forces girls into a hyper-sexualized image creates an even bigger interior conflict for Amy. (...)

Amy does make a choice. She leaves the metaphysical and cultural stage of destructive reality that the overly secular society imposes on her. In her room, the skimpy outfit she wore during the dance competition and the traditional Senegalese dress she’s supposed to wear at her father’s wedding are left in the room. Now, she wears simple jeans and an elegant sweater, as she leaves the apartment complex and jumps rope with different neighborhood girls. It’s Amy’s face that is finally affirmed.

O radicalismo político como forma de fugir ao tédio?

Going to political extremes in response to boredom, por Wijnand A. P. Van Tilburg e Eric R. Igou (European Journal of Social Psychology):

Boredom makes people attempt to re‐establish a sense of meaningfulness. Political ideologies, and in particular the adherence to left‐ versus right‐wing beliefs, can serve as a source of meaning. Accordingly, we tested the hypothesis that boredom is associated with a stronger adherence to left‐ versus right‐wing beliefs, resulting in more extreme political orientations. Study 1 demonstrates that experimentally induced boredom leads to more extreme political orientations. Study 2 indicates that people who become easily bored with their environment adhere to more extreme ends of a political spectrum compared with their less easily bored counterparts. Finally, Study 3 reveals that the relatively extreme political orientations among those who are easily bored can be attributed to their enhanced search for meaning. Overall, our research suggests that extreme political orientations are, in part, a function of boredom's existential qualities.

Uma coisa que isto me fez pensar foi no livro "Admirável Mundo Novo", de Huxley; pessoalmente, acho a parte "subjetiva" (as motivações dos personagens) da história mais interessante que a parte "objetiva" (a descrição da sociedade e da tecnologia): isto, o tipo de sociedade apresentado no livro não me parece ter grande relevância para os dias de hoje, mas suspeito que a psicologia de personagens como Bernard Marx, o amigo publicitário ou o Selvagem explica muito a psicologia de "descontentes" em vários contextos sociais - sobretudo o desejo de ter uma grande causa a que se dedicar, em vez de uma vida banal "narrada por um idiota".

Teoria da ferradura (variante "vamos tomar conta do estado daqui a uns meses, mas queremos acabar com ele")?

Pondo no google (sem aspas) um frase de 1920 de Mussolini contra o estado, a primeira coisa que aparece é "O Estado e a Revolução", de Lenine (onde este, em 1917, também defende que o estado deve começar a desaparecer).

Vaga de esterilizações nos campos de detenção do "SEF" dos EUA?

‘Like an Experimental Concentration Camp’: Whistleblower Complaint Alleges Mass Hysterectomies at ICE Detention Center, por Jerry Lambe (Law and Crime):

Several legal advocacy groups on Monday filed a whistleblower complaint on behalf of a nurse at an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention center documenting “jarring medical neglect” within the facility, including a refusal to test detainees for the novel coronavirus and an exorbitant rate of hysterectomies being performed on immigrant women. (...)

Multiple women came forward to tell Project South about what they perceived to be the inordinate rate at which women in ICDC were subjected to hysterectomies – a surgical operation in which all or part of the uterus is removed. Additionally, many of the immigrant women who underwent the procedure were reportedly “confused” when asked to explain why they had the surgery, with one detainee likening their treatment to prisoners in concentration camps.

“Recently, a detained immigrant told Project South that she talked to five different women detained at ICDC between October and December 2019 who had a hysterectomy done,” the complaint stated. “When she talked to them about the surgery, the women ‘reacted confused when explaining why they had one done.’ The woman told Project South that it was as though the women were ‘trying to tell themselves it’s going to be OK.’”

2020?

Há uns tempos, no princípio do confinamento, escrevi algures num comentário do Facebook que de certeza que a epidemia e o confinamento iriam aparecer, daqui a uns anos, como pano de fundo ou tema de vários filmes.

Mas depois comecei a duvidar disso, já que as gripes asiática e de Hong Kong mataram muito mais gente e penso que a única marca que deixaram na cultura popular foi uma história do Pato Donald, que inclui também motins nas ruas e extra-terrestres*.

*diga-se que, além da história de hoje da fosfina venusiana, há vários meses que andam a correr notícias, na imprensa de referência e/ou com fontes institucionais, relacionadas com OVNIs.

O fim do moderno conservadorismo "liberal na economia, conservador nos costumes"?

Talvez um pouco em sentido contrário ao post anterior...

The Failure of Fusionism, por Grant Wyeth, na Quillette:

Conservative parties throughout the West are in crisis. This may not be fully understood by simply looking at recent election results, as conservative parties have continued to win elections. But these parties are currently in a state of ideological flux, and their commitment to existing liberal democratic principles and institutions are in noticeable decay. The conventional perception of conservative parties as steady and secure governing hands has made way for a more volatile and agitated form of politics. Parties that have routinely positioned themselves as defenders of the established order have instead become actively hostile to it. Conservative parties, the Economist noted last year, are now “on fire and dangerous.” (...)

The forces of freer markets; their unanchored spontaneous order, their economic and social creative destruction, and their inherent cosmopolitanism have deeply affronted those of a conservative disposition. With conservative parties accelerating these forces, Fusionism became an ideology in constant conflict with itself, failing to create a harmonious set of ideas to advance, and instead fostering a sense of discord and disorder for these parties’ natural constituents.

A história do moderno conservadorismo norte-americano

The Long New Right and the World It Made [pdf], por Daniel Schlozman e Sam Rosenfeld

Um aspeto interessante é a referência que os autores fazem ao "pequeno grande capital" - que a base da chamada "nova direita" tem sido as pessoas e famílias que são "ricas" a nível local e regional, não tanto o "grande capital" a nível nacional, e que será isso que explica como a combinação de liberalismo económico e populismo cultural aguentou estas décadas todas (já que o pequeno grande capital se identifica tanto com o liberalismo económico como com o populismo cultural).

Mas acho que se calhar o trumpismo desatualiza um bocado isso (mesmo sendo um paper de 2019); a mim parece-me que o movimento que os autores descrevem no artigo corresponde largamente aos apoiantes de Ted Cruz nas eleições de 2016 (que não a lado nenhum), e que está a surgir uma nova "nova direita" que largamente põe o liberalismo económico na gaveta.

Ainda sobre "discurso de ódio"

French book I Hate Men sees sales boom after government adviser calls for ban, em The Guardian:

Pauline Harmange’s Moi les hommes, je les déteste explores whether women “have good reason to hate men”, and whether “anger towards men is actually a joyful and emancipatory path, if it is allowed to be expressed”. Its small French publisher, Monstrograph, called it a “feminist and iconoclastic book” that “defends misandry as a way of making room for sisterhood”.

Ralph Zurmély, a special adviser to France’s ministry for gender equality, called it an “ode to misandry”. Zurmély, in an email obtained by Mediapart, told Monstrograph that “incitement to hatred on the grounds of gender is a criminal offence”, and asked the publisher to pull the book from publication “on pain of criminal prosecution”.

A respeito disto, Jesse Walker escreve: «This is both a "Hate speech laws will be used against the left too" story and a "Censorship can make things more popular" story.».

Como as leis contra o "discurso de ódio" acabam por atingir a esquerda

In Europe, Hate Speech Laws are Often Used to Suppress and Punish Left-Wing Viewpoints, por Gleen Greenwald, no Intercept:

If hate speech laws existed in the U.S., their prime targets would be pro-Palestinian groups, Muslims, atheists, Black Lives Matter activists, and antifa. (...)

 An excellent Guardian article on Monday by Julia Carrie Wong examines the implications of the growing liberal/left desire for “hate speech” to be restricted — either by the state wielding the power of “hate speech” laws or by private tech executives prohibiting the use of their platforms to disseminate what they regard as “hateful ideas." (...)

Many Americans who long for Europe’s hate speech restrictions assume that those laws are used to outlaw and punish expression of the bigoted ideas they most hate: racism, homophobia, Islamophobia, misogyny. Often, such laws are used that way. There are numerous cases in western Europe and Canada of far-right extremists being arrested, fined, or even jailed for publicly spouting that type of overt bigotry.

But hate speech restrictions are used in those countries to suppress, outlaw, and punish more than far-right bigotry. Those laws have frequently been used to constrain and sanction a wide range of political views that many left-wing censorship advocates would never dream could be deemed “hateful,” and even against opinions which many of them likely share.

France is probably the most extreme case of hate speech laws being abused in this manner. In 2015, France’s highest court upheld the criminal conviction of 12 pro-Palestinian activists for violating restrictions against hate speech. Their crime? Wearing T-shirts that advocated a boycott of Israel — “Long live Palestine, boycott Israel,” the shirts read — which, the court ruled, violated French law that “prescribes imprisonment or a fine of up to $50,000 for parties that ‘provoke discrimination, hatred or violence toward a person or group of people on grounds of their origin, their belonging or their not belonging to an ethnic group, a nation, a race or a certain religion.'”

Uma coisa peculiar a respeito do "discurso de ódio" é que frequentemente as mesmas pessoas que acham que a polícia e o sistema judicial são racistas, estão dispostas a atribuir a esse mesmo sistema judicial o papel de poder decidir o que se pode ou não dizer.

Sobre Twitter e blogues

The World That Twitter Made, em The Scholar's Stage:

In many ways the twitter experience of the user with a low follower account is somewhat similar to the experience of the old blogosphere. Many of my readers came to the internet in the 2010s; before I proceed with this point it is probably sketching out just what the internet was like in the world before them. That internet was organized differently. Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, Medium, Reddit, and Instagram either did not exist then or were the preserve of teenagers and university age students. Those platforms were for flirting and goofing off and gossiping behind your parents back. People who wanted to discuss bigger things—culture, art, history, science, business, politics, or what have you—went to the blogs. Well, the blogs and the forums.

There were two aspects of this older internet ecology that set it apart from the current get up. The first was its clear division into hundreds of separate communities.(...)

 This leads to the second big difference between the internet of the aughts and the internet of the 2010s: the standards for participation were different—in some ways the barrier to entry was both higher and lower than on twitter. In the old days people used to say "if you don't like it, make your own blog!" That directive was easy to follow. It is near impossible for someone de-platformed from twitter to create some new twitter to replace it; in contrast, anybody really could create their own blog (and forums were not hard to stand up either).

But if writers were to have people read their blogs, then their blogs had to be good. This was the price of participation. On twitter, anybody who can think up a snarky 140 characters retort can contribute to the "conversation." In the blogosphere, you had to create your own blog and write up your thoughts in long-form.(...)

The twitter user with 500~ followers in some ways exists in a world similar to the blogosphere of old. She is part of a small, self-selected community. Her followers chose to follow her because they are sympathetic with her ideas or at least interested in them. It is not difficult to have open and honest exchanges when you swim in safe waters. Most people in her network know her, and she knows most of them, so there is little incentive for mischief.

This changes with scale.

Um dia deste, se calhar vou experimentar essa coisa do Twitter (mas por outro lado, pelo que tenho lido, desconfio que já está na fase do declínio).