Empresas geridas pelos trabalhadores e macroeconomia

Um passagem do artigo citado (páginas 84-85) neste post:

We close this section by sketching a hypothesis developed by David I. Levine and a number of co-authors (Levine and Tyson, 1990; Levine, 1993; Levine and Parkin, 1994; Levine, 1995). This is the hypothesis that participatory firms (by extension, LMFs) are disadvantaged for macroeconomic reasons in an economy consisting largely of KMFs. In brief, the argument runs as follows (an elaboration appears in Levine, 1993).

Suppose LMFs do not lay off workers when demand falls, because the workermembers prefer to absorb demand fluctuations through earnings rather than layoffs. The practice of avoiding layoffs will be quite costly to the firm if recessions are long and deep, and may even threaten the survival of the enterprise. On the other hand, suppose KMFs use a more conventional compensation scheme where nominal wages remain fixed over the business cycle, and reductions in demand are absorbed through layoffs. If KMFs are the dominant organizational form, their employment practices will aggravate the business cycle for familiar macroeconomic reasons, leading to longer and deeper recessions than in a world where LMFs are the dominant mode of organization. We thus have the possibililty of multiple equilibria: if KMFs are already dominant, an LMF may not be viable, but if LMFs were already widespread the resulting dampening of the business cycle could enable individual LMFs to thrive (and might even undercut the viability of KMFs).

Porque fui buscar isso - porque faz lembrar a minha teoria de que as empresas em autogestão, durante uma crise, terão menos problemas de rigidez nominal de salários, embora os autores, pelos vistos, consideram isso uma desvantagem a nível microeconómico.