Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia [PDF], por Benjamin A. Olken, na American Political Science Review,Vol. 104, No. 2, (Maio de 2010):
This
article presents an experiment in which 49 Indonesian villages
were randomly assigned to choose development projects
through either representative-based meetings or direct
election-based plebiscites. Plebiscites resulted in dramatically higher
satisfaction among villagers, increased knowledge about the project,
greater perceived benefits, and higher reported willingness to
contribute. Changing the political mechanism had much smaller effects on
the actual projects selected, with some evidence that plebiscites
resulted in projects chosen by women being located in poorer areas. The
results suggest that direct participation in political decision making
can substantially increase satisfaction and legitimacy.
Direct Democracy and Land Use Policy: Exchanging Public Goods for Development Rights [PDF], por Elisabeth R. Gerber and Justin H. Phillips, em Urban Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2, (Fev., 2004):
This study analyses the effects of one type of direct democracy—voter
requirements for new development—on municipal growth. Analysing data
from a sample of California communities, we consider the impact of voter
requirements on the land use process and outcomes. We find that—in
general—voter requirements fail to stop new development; property owners
and developers can and do adapt to the constraints created by these
direct democracy institutions. We also find, however, that voter
requirements change the land use process in important ways.
Specifically, they change the way developers interact with interest
groups in the community and force developers to compensate current
residents for enduring some of the negative aspects of growth.
Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiative [link de acesso restrito], por Elisabeth Gerber, no American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Fev., 1996):
A spatial model of the policy process is used to identify conditions
under which the threat of initiatives constrains legislative behavior.
Legislators in states that allow initiatives are expected to pass laws
that more closely reflect their state's median voter's preference than
legislators in states that do not allow initiatives.
Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old Questions [link de acesso restrito], por Arthur Lupia and John G. Matsusaka, na Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 7 (Junho de 2004):
We organize the discussion around four “old” questions that have long
been at the heart of the direct democracy debate: Are voters competent?
What role does money play? How does direct democracy affect policy? Does
direct democracy benefit the many or the few? We find that recent
breakthroughs in theory and empirical analysis paint a comparatively
positive picture of the initiative and referendum. For example, voters
are more competent, and the relationship between money and power in
direct democracy is less nefarious, than many observers allege. More new
studies show that the mere presence of direct democracy induces sitting
legislatures to govern more effectively.
[
Via Shom Mazumder]