Re: O caso de Chipre (II)

As novas noticias que os bancos cipriotas não irão abrir nos próximos dias fizerem-me lembrar deste post que Paul Krugman escreveu há 3 anos:

 For a long time my view on the euro has been that it may well have been a mistake, but that bygones were bygones — it could not be undone. I was strongly influenced by the view expressed by Barry Eichengreen in a classic 2007 article (although I had heard that argument — maybe from Barry? — long before that piece was published): as Eichengreen argued, any move to leave the euro would require time and preparation, and during the transition period there would be devastating bank runs. So the idea of a euro breakup was a non-starter.

But now I’m reconsidering, for a simple reason: the Eichengreen argument is a reason not to plan on leaving the euro — but what if the bank runs and financial crisis happen anyway? In that case the marginal cost of leaving falls dramatically, and in fact the decision may effectively be taken out of policymakers’ hands. (...)

Think of it this way: the Greek government cannot announce a policy of leaving the euro — and I’m sure it has no intention of doing that. But at this point it’s all too easy to imagine a default on debt, triggering a crisis of confidence, which forces the government to impose a banking holiday — and at that point the logic of hanging on to the common currency come hell or high water becomes a lot less compelling.

[Neste momento, este post faz mais sentido se interpretarmos o "Greek" em "Greek government" no sentido étnico-cultural em vez de politico-estatal, isto é, um "governo de cultura e origem grega" em vez de especificamente o governo do Estado chamado "Grécia"]